Trial of Erich von Manstein

Erich von Manstein (24 November 1887 – 9 June 1973) was a prominent commander of Nazi Germany's World War II army (Heer).

Under pressure from the Soviet Union, the British cabinet decided in July 1948 to prosecute Manstein and several other senior officers who had been held in custody since the end of the war.

His early release on 7 May 1953 was partly because of recurring health problems, but also the result of pressure by Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, B. H. Liddell Hart, and other supporters.

The conduct of the trial was partly responsible for creating the myth of the clean Wehrmacht – the belief that members of the German armed forces acted in isolation, and were not involved or culpable for the events of the Holocaust.

Erich von Manstein, a career military officer, earned the rank of field marshal in 1942 after the successful Siege of Sevastopol.

[1] Germany's fortunes in the war began to take an unfavourable turn after the disastrous Battle of Stalingrad, where Manstein commanded a failed relief effort.

[7] The myth that the Wehrmacht was "clean"—not culpable for the events of the Holocaust—arose partly as a result of this document, written largely by Manstein, along with General of Cavalry Siegfried Westphal.

[8] Documents from 1941 presented at Nuremberg and at Manstein's own later trial contradict this claim: he received regular reports throughout that summer regarding the execution of hundreds of political commissars.

British author B. H. Liddell Hart was in correspondence with Manstein and others at Island Farm and visited inmates of several camps around Britain while preparing his best-selling 1947 book On the Other Side of the Hill.

The two remained in contact, and Liddell Hart later helped Manstein arrange the publication of the English edition of his memoir, Verlorene Siege (Lost Victories), in 1958.

Telford Taylor, recently promoted to Brigadier General and placed in charge of prosecuting war criminals on behalf of the United States, had during the course of the main Nuremberg trials collected a body of evidence against the four generals, falling into three broad categories: the killing of political commissars in the Soviet Union; poor treatment and killing of prisoners of war; and the extermination and enslavement of civilian populations.

In October Winston Churchill, then Leader of the Opposition, spoke out against prosecuting any further German generals, as he felt it would interfere with the process of reconciliation with Germany.

The sixth charge claimed three counts of captured Soviet soldiers being illegally recruited into German armed forces units.

The eleventh charge claimed seventeen counts of soldiers in units commanded by Manstein handing over civilians to the Einsatzgruppe, while knowing that to do so would mean their deaths.

The fourteenth charge accused Manstein of six counts of issuing orders to execute civilians without trial; for merely being suspects; and for having committed offences that did not warrant the death penalty.

The fifteenth charge was that Soviet citizens, in violation of the Hague Convention, had been compelled to build defensive positions and dig trenches in combat areas.

[26] Within the scope of the first three charges, which covered events in Poland while Manstein was chief of staff of an army group, were some 1,209 deaths, including 22 Jews who were killed in the town square in Końskie on 12 September 1939.

The fourth charge consisted of eleven counts of failure to protect the lives and ensure the humane treatment of prisoners of war; the prosecution presented evidence that 7,393 people died as a result of maltreatment or were shot dead.

Carr described how the population was driven for hundreds of miles while lacking adequate food and clothing, resulting in uncounted deaths.

Sixteen other witnesses were called for the defence, several of whom were members of his staff, who testified that Manstein had no knowledge of or involvement in the genocide.

His quartermaster, Colonel Friedrich-Wilhelm Hauck, and Generalleutnant Konrad Stephanus, who had served as his head of anti-partisan operations, testified that Manstein did not have any knowledge of or involvement in the killing of Jews.

Hauck testified in camera that he himself had been personally responsible for arranging for logistical support for the SD in the Crimea, and that Manstein was not involved.

[37] In his closing address, Paget minimised the contributions of the military elite to the decision-making process regarding the conduct of the war, and characterised the charges of atrocities as Soviet propaganda.

Regarding Manstein's use of the scorched earth tactic, Collingwood pointed out that it was not done out of any military necessity, but had been planned and ordered well in advance.

[45] Modern researchers, including Benoît Lemay, find that Manstein tacitly accepted the actions of the Einsatzgruppen, and did nothing to prevent their activities.

Manstein (centre) with Adolf Hitler in the Soviet Union, 1943