The North African coast has few natural harbors and the British base at Alexandria on the Nile delta was some 2,100 km (1,300 mi) by road from the main Italian port at Tripoli in Libya.

With the arrival of the German Afrika Korps, the Axis counter-attacked in Operation Sonnenblume and in April 1941 reached the limit of their supply capacity at the Egyptian border but failed to recapture Tobruk.

In November 1941 the British Eighth Army recovered, helped by the short supply distance from Alexandria to the front line and launched Operation Crusader, relieving the Siege of Tobruk and again reached El Agheila.

[6] Instead it was agreed that landings would be made to secure the Vichy territories in North Africa (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) and then to thrust east to take the Axis forces in the Western Desert in their rear.

However, there was a limit to how far east the Torch landings could be made because of the increasing proximity of Axis airfields in Sicily and Sardinia which at the end of October held 298 German and 574 Italian aircraft.

[12] The Allies, although they had provided for the possibility of strong Vichy opposition to their landings both in terms of infantry and air force allocations, seriously underestimated the Axis appetite for and speed of intervention in Tunisia.

Most of the inland western border with Algeria (the back) is astride the eastern line of the Atlas Mountains which run from the Atlantic coast of Morocco, 1,900 kilometres (1,200 mi) east to Tunis.

[19] The First Army (Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson) was immediately ordered to send the 36th Infantry Brigade Group, which had been the floating reserve for the Algiers landing, eastward by sea to occupy the Algerian ports of Bougie, Philippeville, and Bône and the airfield at Djedjelli, preliminary to advancing into Tunisia.

[26] On 17 November, the same day Nehring arrived, the leading elements of the British 36th Brigade on the northern road met a mixed force of 17 tanks and 400 paratroops with self-propelled guns at Djebel Abiod.

The German paratroopers, with Luftwaffe and Italian fire support from the 1st Infantry Division "Superga", knocked out 11 tanks but their advance was halted while the fight at Djebel Abiod continued for nine days.

[25] The attack threatened to cut off 11th Brigade and break through into the Allied rear, but desperate fighting over four days delayed the Axis advance and permitted a controlled withdrawal to the high ground on each side of the river west of Terbourba.

[35] The Allied force initially withdrew roughly 9.7 km (6 mi) to the high positions of Longstop Hill (Djebel el Ahmera) and Bou Aoukaz on each side of the river.

[45] Several counterattacks were organised, including a belated attack by Combat Command B of the US 1st Armored Division but all of these were beaten off with ease by Arnim's forces which by this time had created strong defensive positions.

[48] General Vittorio Ambrosio, the new Chief of the Comando Supremo plans to send 10,000 German troops to Tunis , but the decision was never made due to the lack of Italian naval resources.

[49] After further discussion, the Comando Supremo issued orders on 19 February for Rommel to attack through the Kasserine and Sbiba passes toward Thala and Le Kef to threaten First Army's flank.

Rommel's original proposal was for a limited but concentrated attack through Kasserine to confront II Corps' strength at Tébessa and gain vital supplies from the US dumps there.

[50] On 19 February 1943, Rommel, having now been given formal control of the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions, the Afrika Korps battlegroup as well as General Messe's forces on the Mareth defences (renamed Italian First Army),[51] launched what would become the Battle of Kasserine Pass.

[51] It had not had time to organise properly but was able to direct heavy artillery fire from the surrounding heights which brought the leading mechanised units of the Afrika Korps batlegroup to a halt.

[55] By 1pm on 21 February, Battlegroup von Broich was in contact with the dug-in tanks of B Squadron 2nd Lothians and Border Horse of the 26th Armoured Brigade on the Thala road and making slow progress.

[61] Shortly after taking up his new appointment, Alexander reported to London, ...I am frankly shocked at the whole situation as I have found it...Real fault has been the lack of direction from above from [the] very beginning resulting in no policy and no plan.

The co-ordinated land, sea and air power of the Allies would draw a net round the Axis forces in Tunisia by 30 April, to meet the timetable set at the Casablanca Conference to allow Sicily to be invaded during the favourable weather of August.

The lessons of the Desert Campaign had not been used in planning for Torch, which constrained the ability of the air arm, already short of aircraft and supplies, to provide tactical support to the army during the Run for Tunis.

With the failure of Capri, Rommel decided that the only way to save the Axis armies would be to abandon the campaign, and on 9 March he travelled to Italy for discussions with Comando Supremo in Rome.

In the next 48 hours the Axis defenders pulled out of the Mareth Line, establishing a new defensive position 60 kilometres (37 mi) to the north-west at Wadi Akarit near Gabès.

On 26 February, Arnim, in the mistaken belief that the Kasserine battles had forced the Allies to weaken the north to reinforce the south, launched Operation Ochsenkopf ("Ox Head") against V Corps, across a wide front and commanded by General Weber.

This delay was critical and as a result the British force was able to prepare a significant killing field at Hunts Gap (an area between Medjez and about 24 km (15 mi) north-east of Béja).

The Allied forces had reorganised and during the night of 19/20 April, the Eighth Army captured Enfidaville against the Italian 16th Motorized Division "Pistoia", which counter-attacked several times over the next three days and was repulsed and the action at Takrouna also took place.

In 1966, the British Official Historian I. S. O. Playfair wrote that Had the Allies been able to get a tighter stranglehold on the Axis communications immediately after the 'Torch' landings, they might have won the gamble of the Tunisian Campaign by the end of 1942 and victory in Africa as a whole might have been close.

Conversely, the Axis might have staved off for a long time their defeat in May 1943 had their forces received the supplies they needed.In 1995 American historian Williamson Murray was more critical: The decision to reinforce North Africa was one of the worst of Hitler's blunders: admittedly, it kept the Mediterranean closed for six more months, with a negative impact on the Allied shipping situation but it placed some of Germany's best troops in an indefensible position from which, like Stalingrad, there would be no escape.

Even the US defeat at Kasserine may have been paradoxically advantageous; Rommel and the Axis were lulled into a false impression of US capabilities, while the Americans learned valuable lessons, and made positive changes in their command structure and tactics.