Tunisian independence

World War II brought about a halt in Tunisia's bid for independence, but helped win Bourguiba a transfer from a French prison to an Axis one in Rome.

The Nazis attempted to pressure Bourguiba into helping the Axis powers with his influence over the Tunisian independence fighters in pushing back the Allied invasion of North Africa.

He refused – primarily due to his belief that Germany would lose the war and was released from prison in 1943 when the Nazi campaign was finally defeated at El Alamein in Egypt.

As a means of forcing the French to leave, the Neo Destour returned to armed resistance by carrying attacks on colonial facilities spearheaded by militants such as Chedly Kallala.

In June 1954, new French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France came to power and immediately instituted a withdrawal policy from Tunisia to lessen the violent backlashes occurring in the colonies.

Jean Mons was obliged to recognise that once the threat of being deposed had been removed from him, Lamine Bey was determined to win the acclaim of his people and therefore worked willingly with the nationalists.

[5] In April, after a meeting with Bourguiba, the Bey wrote directly to French President Vincent Auriol pressing him to agree reforms admitting Tunisians to a substantially larger share of self-government.

[7] On 19 June a new Resident General, Louis Périllier, was appointed[8] with an explicit mission from the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman to prepare Tunisia for internal autonomy.

On 19 May Périllier, in full uniform, accompanied by a military escort, went for an audience with the Bey to make an official protest at this snub, and to ask for the dismissal of Chenik and Ben Youssef.

[22] Hautecloque was back again the following day, to demand the withdrawal of a memorandum outlining Tunisian protests about French rule which he had discovered Chenik's cabinet had sent to the United Nations, and the dismissal of the two ministers responsible for delivering it.

Having disclaimed involvement in the memorandum itself, the Bey took no responsibility for its consequences when the two ministers who submitted it, Salah Ben Youssef and Hamadi Badra were eventually forced to resign under French pressure.

Unrest spread and on 24 January De Hauteclocque was obliged to ask the Bey to issue an appeal for calm, agreeing to withdraw his insistence on the resignation of the Chenik government.

He once again demanded the resignation of the Chenik government, and the Bey responded with another angry telegram to President Vincent Auriol complaining of De Hauteclocque's discourteous and threatening tone.

Deprived of the support of his ministers, on 28 March the Bey eventually gave way and signed the decree naming De Hauteclocque's nominee Slaheddine Baccouche as his Grand Vizier.

Determined to boycott the Baccouche government, the Bey relied more and more on his son Chedly and surrounded himself with counsellors he felt he could trust, including Mzali, Farhat Hached, Hédi Nouira and Sadok Mokaddem.

On 1 August he brought together in his palace in Carthage forty leading Tunisian figures representing a range of views to seek their opinions on the proposals from France.

According to Ahmed Mestiri the minute outlining the rejection was drafted in secret by the underground leadership of the Neo Destour before being passed to the Assembly through Hached and Mokaddem and approved by them.

[40] With all his nationalist advisers either in prison or in exile, the Bey had no-one to support him apart from Farhat Hached, the trade union leader, who visited him every day, encouraging him to stand firm.

[41] On 5 December 1952, Hached was assassinated by 'La Main Rouge' (The Red Hand), a terrorist unit operated by the French state to eliminate nationalists in North Africa.

[42] Anyone else who might advise or support the Bey was kept out of the way: Mohamed Salah Mzali was obliged to leave Tunis and remain in Monastir and when he tried to telephone the palace he found that all the lines had been cut.

[44] With France's negative response on 20 December, he was able to resist no longer, and signed the decrees formulated months previously in Paris, which allowed for new municipal elections.

When he learned that he had finally given way and authorised the French proposals, he remarked 'I don't think we need to throw stones at this venerable old man who struggles alone in almost desperate conditions against an enemy who has no conscience and can exert such pressure.

'[47] In any case, the reforms imposed by the French, on which they set such great store, remained a dead letter – the nationalists launched a campaign of terror against both candidates and voters.

It is hard for us to recall the painful days that all of Tunisia has lived through.... before this decisive step in our national life, we must stand equal to our destiny in offering to the world the spectacle of a united people marching serenely towards progress.

To recover some semblance of his former influence, on 10 August he proposed to the French government that the institution of the beylicate should be replaced with a full monarchy, which would give him the authority he felt was appropriate.

Having crossed the capital in triumph, Bourguiba visited the Bey in Carthage, apparently unmindful of having returned his decoration only a few months before,[64] and made a stirring declaration of the deep attachment felt by the Tunisian people towards beylical rule.

The French had already transferred authority over the police force from the Resident General to the Tunisian government, whose ministers had been chosen by Bourguiba, so Ben Youssef's representations to the Bey had no effect.

On 2 December the Bey summoned the Resident General (now known as the High Commissioner) Roger Seydoux to remind him of France's responsibility for public order – which in fact it no longer had.

[68] As his appeals had no effect he made use of the only power remaining to him and refused to apply his seal to the decrees authorising the forthcoming elections and the appointment of local governors and mayors.

The new Tunisian government, led by Bourguiba, deemed the country to be independent by virtue of this protocol, and therefore refused to enter into the subsequent bilateral negotiations it provided for.