During World War I, the Air Service's aircraft strength grew from a few dozen to more than 11,000 planes, and the number of aviation personnel came to total more than 190,000.

Although Congress, as well as most Army leaders, rejected Mitchell's argument, the Air Service did become a separate combat arm, equal in status to the infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

Like Billy Mitchell before them, they advocated using air power independently of the Army ground forces to destroy enemy targets behind the lines of combat.

This Air Corps emphasis on strategic operations disturbed some ground forces leaders, who believed their aerial support needs were being neglected.

The Army experimented with using small organic aircraft for artillery fire adjustment and other functions in maneuvers at Camp Beauregard, La., in August 1940.

During World War II, Piper L-4 Grasshoppers and a few larger Stinson L-5 Sentinels were used to adjust artillery fire, gather intelligence, support naval bombardment, direct bombing missions, and perform other functions.

When the United States Air Force was established as a separate service in 1947, the Army developed its light planes and rotary wing aircraft to support its ground operations.

Transport helicopters nevertheless proved themselves by moving cargo and personnel during the final months of the war and then by participating in prisoner exchanges and other functions after the cessation of hostilities.

During the Korean War, the Department of Air Training at Post Field expanded, and in early 1953, it became the Army Aviation School.

The Howze Board recommended the extensive use of helicopters to transport infantry troops, artillery, and supplies, as well as to provide local aerial fire support.

This growth caused increasingly complex problems in training, procurement, doctrine development, proponent responsibility, and personnel management.

Other important helicopters in Vietnam included the Boeing CH-47 Chinook, the Hughes OH-6 Cayuse, the Bell OH-58 Kiowa, and the Sikorsky CH-54 Tarhe.

Under the Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966, the Army agreed to limit its fixed-wing aviation role to administrative mission support (light unarmed aircraft of civilian design).

Afterwards, the Army turned its major attention back to the threat of a mid or high intensity conflict in Europe, and doubts reemerged about the value of helicopters in that sort of arena.

To gain general acceptance and ensure further success, Army Aviation continued to develop new doctrine, tactics, aircraft, equipment, and organizational structure.

In 1982, Jack V. Mackmull, the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, participated in the Army Aviation Review study project as chairman of the Tactical Employment Committee.

For example, during operations in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf region, Army Aviation played major and decisive roles.

Apache helicopters destroyed key Iraqi early warning radar sites and thus opened the air corridors to Baghdad for the bombing campaign that preceded the ground war.

By the late 1990s, continuing deficiencies and unintended results of the ARI led to a series of aviation plans as key pieces of the Army-wide modernization and transformation.

Examples were uses of AH-64 Apaches in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans as a deterrent to mobs threatening fellow citizens or paramilitary groups trying to remove weapons from agreed cantonments.

On the modern battlefield, Army Aviation, unlike the other members of the combined arms team, has the organic flexibility, versatility, and assets to fulfill a variety of maneuver, CS, CSS, roles and functions.