The ensuing investigation, chaired by Admiral James L. Holloway III, the retired Chief of Naval Operations, cited lack of command and control and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.

Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with low-intensity conflicts.

[14] In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change.

"[17] James R. Locher III, the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats.

In December 1987, Congress directed Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement.

During Operation Earnest Will, the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the Persian Gulf during the Iran–Iraq War.

[16] The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases.

The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern Persian Gulf to thwart clandestine Iranian mining and small boat attacks.

[citation needed] On 14 April 1988, 65 miles (100 km) east of Bahrain, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine, blowing an immense hole in its hull.

[16] Special operations forces provided critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and balk Iran's small boats and minelayers.

On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships.

[33] On 3 October, TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time into Aidid's stronghold the Bakara Market to capture two of his key lieutenants.

[32] Helicopters carried an assault and a ground convoy of security teams launched in the late afternoon from the TF Ranger compound at Mogadishu airport.

The assault team captured 24 Somalis including Aidid's lieutenants and were loading them onto the convoy trucks when a MH-60 Blackhawk was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG).

[16][33] A small element from the security forces, as well as an MH-6 assault helicopter and an MH-60 carrying a fifteen-man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, rushed to the crash site.

[16] The assault and security elements moved on foot towards the first crash area, passing through heavy fire, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed helicopter.

[34] Reinforcements, consisting of elements from the QRF, 10th Mountain Division soldiers, Rangers, SEALs, Pakistan Army tanks and Malaysian armored personnel carriers, finally arrived at 1:55 am on 4 October.

The main force of the convoy arrived at the Pakistani Stadium-compound for the QRF-at 6:30 am,[32] thus concluding one of the bloodiest and fiercest urban firefights since the Vietnam War.

SOF performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions, assisted with humanitarian relief, protected American forces, and conducted riverine patrols.

[16][27] USSOCOM's 10th Special Forces Group, elements of JSOC, and CIA/SAD Paramilitary Officers linked up again and were the first to enter Iraq prior to the invasion.

[39][40] United States Special Operations Command played a pivotal role in fighting the former Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001[41] and toppling it thereafter, as well as combating the insurgency and capturing Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

One such battle happened during Operation Anaconda, the mission to squeeze the life out of a Taliban and Al-Qaeda stronghold dug deep into the Shah-i-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains of eastern Afghanistan.

Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, Air Force Combat Controllers, and Pararescuemen fought against entrenched Al-Qaeda fighters atop a 10,000-foot (3,000 m) mountain.

According to an executive summary, the Battle of Takur Ghar was the most intense firefight American special operators have been involved in since 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993.

One study identified joint-training exercises in Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Germany, Indonesia, Mali, Norway, Panama, and Poland in 2010 and also, through mid-year 2011, in the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Romania, Senegal, South Korea, and Thailand, among other nations.

[54] In 2010, White House counterterrorism director John O. Brennan said that the United States "will not merely respond after the fact" of a terrorist attack but will "take the fight to al-Qaeda and its extremist affiliates whether they plot and train in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and beyond."

One possible legal justification – the permission of the country in question – is complicated in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, where the governments privately agree but do not publicly acknowledge approving the attacks," as one report put it.

Originally known as Task Force 121, it was formed in the summer of 2003 when the military merged two existing Special Operations units, one hunting Osama bin Laden in and around Afghanistan, and the other tracking Sadaam Hussein in Iraq.

These teams are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a variety of missions to include direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare and support psychological and civil affairs operations.

The Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) is small group of special forces personnel, sometimes just one or two at a time, attached to embassies in Africa, Southeast Asia, South America, or elsewhere that terrorists are thought to be operating, planning attacks, raising money or seeking safe haven, especially those teams in the United States.