It was established by the president Eduard Shevardnadze, who had previously served as the Communist leader of the Georgian SSR from 1972 to 1985, and David Chantladze, former General Trade Representative of the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia.

The government is generally described as being "semi-authoritarian" tolerating pluralism and political competition as long as it did not substantially challenge the party’s grip on power.

[7] In November 1993, in the last days of the Georgian Civil War, Shevardnadze founded Union of Citizens of Georgia (UCG), which gained a majority in the parliament in a coalition with a group of independent MPs.

The reforms have been described as bringing "Georgia closer to European standards", nevertheless, the country’s democratic nature was still subject to frequent criticism.

[7] By the late 90s, the government’s popularity drastically decreased being attributed to its inability to exert territorial control over the country, weak economic growth, and lack of development of public infrastructure.

[7] National Movement and Burjanadze-Democrats organized mass rallies in protest of the official results demanding the government either recognize the opposition's victory or resign.

[7] Saakashvili emerged as the clear leader from the protests, with him winning an overwhelming victory in the snap 2004 presidential election, where he ran virtually uncontested.

[2][3] The party has been described as being created by Eduard Shevardnadze to sideline the military leaders who brought him to power through the 1991–1992 Georgian coup d'état.

Shevardnadze was accused of pro-Russian policies such as joining the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States in 1993, signing the Georgian-Russian friendship treaty in 1994, legitimizing the Russian military bases in Georgia in 1995 and supporting Russia during the First Chechen War.

However, some analysts differentiate between this "pragmatic" and "sincere" pro-Russian approaches, arguing that the "sincere" pro-Russian sentiments were also present in Shevardnadze's rhetoric, with Shevardnadze justifying joining the CIS in 1993 to receive Russian support during the Georgian Civil War by alluding to Heraclius II of Georgia signing a treaty on protectorate with Russia in 1783.

Joining CIS was presented by the pro-CIS politicians as a destined embrace of Russia to avert the otherwise inevitable destruction of the country and restore the security and stability, as well as overcome economic crisis.

However, this approach still was based not on Slavophile, Eurasianist or Russian exceptionalist sentiments but on a longing for Soviet-era stability, and also it was not anti-Western as the government simultaneously sought closer ties with the West, and chose to follow the IMF and the World Bank guidance instead of entering the Ruble Zone [ru].

[16] The documents on basic principles of foreign policy, the military doctrine and national security concept passed by the parliament and the ministry of defence in 1997 emphasized Georgia's allegiance to the Western model of liberal democracy and conformity of Georgian laws to international norms.

The Military Doctrine was the most cautious, declaring the priority of "establishing peaceful relations with neighboring countries", primarily referring to Russia and Turkey.

The document on basic principles was the harshest towards Russia, accusing it of seeing CIS as the first step towards reconstitution of the USSR, condemning it for interfering in the separatist conflicts to undermine Georgian statehood and historically trying to turn Georgia into "satellite or, in the worst scenario, a colonial country".

[16] The Shevardnadze's tenure also saw deepening of the relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, specifically over the construction of Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, the development of TRACECA, partnership in BSEC and GUAM, trade and army trainings.

[16] The building of pipeline was also perceived as being opposed by Russia because it provided alternative to the Russian route for transferring the oil from the Caspian oil-fields, and therefore resulted in its lose of revenue and domination over the region.

[18][19] In December 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced visa regime for Georgian citizens ostensibly to prevent Chechen "terrorists" and "criminal groups" from re-entering Russia.

[20] In his speech in 2000, President Shevardnadze condemned Russia for treating Georgia as a "younger brother that can be listened to or ignored" rather than a partner, and accused it of using the Pankisi Gorge crisis for "unfriendly aims".