[a] Following an uprising in the western districts of the state and an armed invasion by Pashtun tribes from Pakistan, the Maharaja acceded to India on 26 October 1947.

In response, Pakistan denied involvement in the conflict and made counter-accusations claiming that India had acquired the state's accession by "fraud and violence" and that it was conducting a "genocide" against Muslims.

The first part increased the Commission's strength to five members and asked it to proceed to the Indian subcontinent at once to mediate between India and Pakistan.

[6] The resolution was passed under the Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter (which is devoted to "peaceful settlement of disputes").

Korbel states that the Security Council could have requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the legal issues.

Its evaluation of the Kashmir dispute was not realistic as was discovered soon with prolonged debates, endless wrangling, and adjournment of the deliberations.

With the passing of time, the tensions and political cleavages in Kashmir grew and the plebiscite solution became increasingly difficult.

They depended on the goodwill of India and Pakistan cooperating with the Security Council and failed to give it the authority to impose sanctions.

[9] It is apparent that the Security Council viewed the problem as primarily a political dispute rather than looking at its legal underpinnings, in particular whether Kashmir's accession to India was valid.

It also felt the requirement of a coalition government would put Sheikh Abdullah, then Prime Minister of Kashmir, in an impossible position.

It wanted an equal representation in the government of the state for the Muslim Conference, the dominant party of the Pakistani-held Kashmir.

[13] The Pakistani government circles felt that the Security Council deliberations had been favourable to Pakistan but the final proposals were modified by the United States and Britain to "mollify" India.

[16] Upon arriving in Karachi, the Commission was informed by Pakistan that three brigades of its regular troops had been fighting in Kashmir since May, which was described as a "bombshell" by Josef Korbel.

The three-part structure implicitly recognized Pakistan's "aggression" by making the truce agreement precede the consultation for the future of the state.

[25][26] Despite reservations, questions and dissents, the two governments finally accepted the proposals, leading to a ceasefire in Kashmir on 1 January 1949.

[28] The Commission returned to the subcontinent in February 1949 to implement the terms of the ceasefire, set up a truce agreement and prepare for a plebiscite.

[31] The so-called 'Azad forces' were made up of the demobilised soldiers of the British Indian Army belonging to the Poonch and Mirpur districts.

The Commission conceded that the Azad forces now had a strength that changed the military situation and made the Indian withdrawal as envisaged in the original resolution difficult.

It proposed that the areas should be governed by "local authorities" under the supervision of the Commission and Indian forces would be sent only if the UN observers notified it of their necessity.

It recommended that the Commission be replaced by a single mediator; that the problem of demilitarisation be viewed as a whole without the required sequentiality of the August resolution; that the UN representatives should have the authority to settle issues by arbitration.

The Czech delegate submitted a minority report contending that the Commission's declaration of failure was premature, that the problem of Azad forces had been underrated, and that the Northern Areas did not receive adequate attention.

[34] The Security Council asked its Canadian delegate, General A. G. L. McNaughton, to informally consult India and Pakistan towards a demilitarisation plan.

The McNaughton proposals represented an important departure from those of the UNCIP resolutions in that they treated India and Pakistan on an equal footing.

[35][36] Despite India's apparent objection, the Security Council adopted the McNaughton proposals in Resolution 80 and appointed a mediator.

In 1972, following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement, agreeing to resolve all their differences through bilateral negotiations.

[37][38][39][40][41] In 2001, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan during his visit to India and Pakistan, clarified that Kashmir resolutions are only advisory recommendations and they should not be compared to those on East Timor and Iraq.