Following the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, India's Governor General Mountbatten flew to Lahore on 1 November 1947 for a conference with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an 'impartial reference to the will of the people'.

[1] The Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, where Nehru informed Khan of India's intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 (Chapter VI) of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations `likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace'.

[3] Following the set-up of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948.

[5] It reported to the Security Council in August 1948 that "the presence of troops of Pakistan" inside Kashmir represented a "material change" in the situation.

From the Indian perspective, the plebiscite was meant to confirm the accession, which was in all respects already complete, and Pakistan could not aspire to an equal footing with India in the contest.

It believed that the Azad Kashmir movement as well as the tribal incursions were indigenous and spontaneous, and Pakistan's assistance to them was not open to criticism.

[20] The liberation of Bangladesh and 1972 Simla Agreement made India harden its stance on aversion to United Nations mediation on Kashmir.

Pakistan independently and through bodies such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, continues to raise the issue at the United Nations General Assembly.

[28] Mediatory reports include: In December 1949 the Canadian president of the UNSC, General McNaughton, was requested by the council to approach the two states to solve the dispute.

"[33][34] The McNaughton proposals were popular in the Security Council, which then passed a resolution giving both states a time period of five months to arrange the demilitarisation scheme.

[clarification needed] The council then appointed Sir Owen Dixon as the next UN representative to the two countries; and he was tasked with administering McNaughton's demilitarisation scheme, which India had already rejected.

[35][36][32] On the Pakistani side of the ceasefire line, Sir Owen Dixon proposed that the areas demilitarized by Pakistan would be governed by the local authorities under supervision by the commission, according to the "law and custom" of the State before the conflict started.

[37] Next, Dixon put before the prime ministers of the two countries some proposals such as establishing a coalition government between Sheikh Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas or distributing the portfolios between the various parties.

Dixon's second suggestion was to establish a neutral government by respectable non-political people for a six-month period prior to a referendum, in which membership would be split between Hindus and Muslims equally, under United Nations supervision.

[40] Dixon agreed that people in Jammu and Ladakh were clearly in favour of India; equally clearly, those in Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas wanted to be part of Pakistan.

Henderson believed that because of Indian allegations, kindled by Nehru, that America was biased in favour of Pakistan, the Americans ought to distance themselves from the Kashmir dispute, which Washington did so in 1950.

[50] When Dixon's successor, Dr Frank Graham, arrived in the subcontinent during a time of tension, he tried to effect demilitarisation prior to a plebiscite but India and Pakistan could not agree on the number of troops who were to remain in Kashmir.

Similar to the experience of previous UN representatives, Graham had first proposed a demilitarisation scheme which found acceptance from Pakistan but rejection from India.

Thereafter, Graham gave an alternative proposal whereby both countries were to gradually reduce their forces to minimal levels and to the ratio of their presence in the state on 1 January 1949.

Dr Graham reported his failure to the Security Council, which subsequently passed a resolution in December 1951 calling for India and Pakistan to come to an agreement on reducing the size of their forces.

Dr Graham submitted a second report to the United Nations in December to recount the failure of his endeavors to achieve a demilitarisation for a plebiscite.

But by the fourth report in October 1952 Graham had to inform the Security Council that the negotiations had stumbled again over the question of the size and type of forces to be permitted for both sides.

The two questions during this mediation which India and Pakistan differed upon was the number of troops to remain after demilitarisation on each side and when the plebiscite administrator could assume their tasks.

India has partially restricted the activities of the unarmed 45 UN observers on the Indian side of the Line of Control on the grounds that the mandate of UNMOGIP has lapsed.

[57][58] Despite the limitations on its mandate, UNMOGIP continues to operate in the region by reporting on the situation along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir.

The primary tasks of UNMOGIP include observing and reporting, investigating complaints of ceasefire violations, and submitting its findings to each party and to the Secretary-General.

[59] The mission plays a crucial role in monitoring and reporting on the situation along the Line of Control (LoC), thereby contributing to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

These include restrictions on the movement of UNMOGIP officials, long delays in obtaining visas, and difficulties in conducting operational tasks.