It is notable in that it recognizes non-state proliferation as a threat to the peace under the terms of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and creates an obligation for states to modify their internal legislation.

The resolution itself states in its opening paragraph: "proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security".

To further these ends, one of the main functions of the committee has been as a "clearing house" of offers and requests for assistance in fulfilling obligations created by the resolution.

Resolution 1540 was adopted by the UN Security Council in response to the unmasking of the Abdul Qadeer Khan proliferation network but also with the aim of preventing the acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons by terrorist groups.

Resolution 1540 is a notable development both in that it explicitly recognises non-state proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a threat to peace and security in and of itself and in that it obliges member states to make internal legislative changes.

Negotiations leading up to the vote of resolution 1540 were officially open only to UN Security Council members, but information on the early drafts circulated with relative freedom and input from other states and NGOs was solicited due to the political sensitivity of the issues involved.

Special attention was paid to the principal non-aligned states in order to put pressure on Pakistan, at the time a member of the Security Council, to fall in line with the majority opinion.

A grassroots mobilisation was organised by, among others, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Abolition 2000 and the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, demanding that the draft resolution be debated in an open session of the Security Council.

"[12] Speaking for Brazil, Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg brought up the question of disarmament, which had been a concern of many non-aligned movement countries throughout the negotiation process and before, given the inegalitarian regime created by instruments such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Equally, the early drafts of the resolution contained explicit references to the Proliferation Security Initiative which were removed at the request of China, which remains opposed to the scheme, alleging that it violates the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The resolution goes beyond the three main non-proliferation treaties and specifies in article 2 and 3 the additional measures required concerning financial, security, and physical protection of sensitive materials and also border and export controls.

[17] The CWC and its mandated organization the OPCW face new challenges in a changing international WMD context which Resolution 1540 aims to remedy.

Comprehensive national implementing legislation is not only necessary to fully meet the obligations to the CWC, but it is vital in preventing non-state actors from gaining access to chemical weapons and UNSCR 1540 has rendered it a mandatory requirement.

Although the CWC has an effective verification regime by international inspectors of the OPCW, this may not always be the case when faced with non-state actors if there exists no national legislation that grants easy access to private residences.

There exists a modest consultative compliance mechanism, but negotiations to establish an international organization for the prohibition of biological weapons to oversee implementation and conduct monitoring and verification have broken down in 2001.

[19] UNSCR 1540 promotes a greater understanding of non-proliferation instruments related to means of delivery such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

[25] While ASEAN has been largely supportive of the resolution, it has also been criticised firstly as a US-inspired attempt to interfere in matters belonging to the domain of national sovereignty,[26] as a "one size fits all" approach to the question[27] and for being far too demanding in terms of resources for small countries to implement correctly.

[31] Asia has been the source of most recent proliferation activities, notably in India and Pakistan,[32] Israel,[33] Iran[34] and North Korea,[35] and those involving the A. Q. Khan network.

[36] While most African states lack the technology to be serious proliferation threats, the numerous zones of lawlessness on the continent make it a useful hub for various clandestine activities, notably drug and people trafficking.

This has largely been attributed to a lack of resources, and the existence of more pressing problems such as AIDS, small arms proliferation and conflict, but certain members of the non-aligned movement have also raised concerns over the possible impact of the resolution on national sovereignty.

[40] Angola, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar and Morocco have all presented requests for assistance in fulfilling their 1540 obligations to the committee,[5] with South Africa providing an offer of help.

[25] Since 2003 the European Union has integrated a non-proliferation clause into its common foreign and security policy, requiring that its trading partners take steps to "sign, ratify or accede to, as appropriate, and fully implement all (…) relevant international instruments" relating to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons".

[43] Albania, Lithuania, Montenegro and Serbia have requested assistance in fulfilling their obligations under the resolution,[5] whereas a majority of European states have provided offers of help: Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The Bahamas, Belize, CARICOM and Guatemala have requested assistance in implementing the resolution[5] while Canada, Cuba and the United States have offered help.