United States Intelligence Community Oversight duties are shared by both the executive and legislative branches of the government.
Given the natural competition that exists between the legislative and executive branches, this overlap creates tensions as both sides struggle to accomplish certain goals using their respective powers and authorities.
[2] Although the Constitution gives the executive branch preeminence in dealing with intelligence matters, Article I nevertheless provides Congress with an important oversight role.
[2] The floor debate for the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 provided a clear example of the difficulties Congress faces when trying to modify intelligence legislation.
Members, for reasons of classification or technical complexity, did not share a common understanding of the law, let alone how it should be adjusted.
This sometimes grueling process forces the White House to carefully select its nominees and provides an opportunity for Senate input on both the individuals and issues related to intelligence policy.
In recent years, the Senate has withheld confirmation until the executive branch agreed to share additional information on key areas of congressional oversight of intelligence activities.
However, the power of this tool depends in large part on Congress's awareness of intelligence community activities.
Under the PIAB is the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), which is used to carry out investigations and initiate analysis activities for the President.
For example, in 2007, the State Department Inspector General, Howard Krongard, recused himself from investigating the activities of the American Private Military Company, Blackwater Security due to revelations during a House Oversight and Government Affairs Committee hearing that Mr. Krongard's brother served on Blackwater’s advisory board.
The main objective of IOP is "to ensure that the DoD can conduct its intelligence and counterintelligence missions while protecting the statutory and constitutional rights of U.S.
Congressional oversight focuses on the supervising of the budget, quality of analysis, legality of actions, and intelligence failures.
These congressional organizations emerged in the late 1970s, when the Church and Pike Committees investigated the CIA and other intelligence agencies in response to the Watergate scandal.
Commissioners thought this was important to ensure that the SSCI members included lawmakers familiar with the issues and interests that each of those four committees covers.
One seat from both the majority and minority party are reserved for standing committee members from Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Judiciary.
This allows each of these committees to have some control over the intelligence community actions and have access to examine size, shape, organization and programs of the agencies.
Hearings are usually adversarial in nature and try to ensure that the agencies comply with laws, and that administrative policies reflect the public interest.
Another example is the joint House and Senate Intelligence Committees inquiry after the September 11 attacks; the report produced presented the findings, conclusions, a discussion, and a series of recommendations.
The senate select committee was given the task of examining whether the intelligence community could accurately monitor treaty compliance.
The commission recommended to reduce redundancy, and to unify the congressional oversight community, for example creating a standing joint House/Senate Intelligence committee.
Some Congressional members wish to consolidate oversight in keeping with the 9/11 Commission recommendations, such as Representative Carolyn Maloney, (D-NY), who, in 2004, proposed that the House shift the House Intelligence Committee status to a standing committee and giving it exclusive jurisdiction over the intelligence community.
Redundancy advocates argue that it reduces group think and favoritism; produces competition; and increases reliability by decreasing the chances of the system failing entirely.
[1] Subject to the law, the President of the United States may control the type and amount of classified information shared with Congress.
Many Administrations have argued using the vagueness of the statement, that disclosing intelligence budget figures would harm national security.
Such requests are made most often by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).