United States Strategic Bombing Survey
Only one position of some influence was given to a prominent military officer, USAAF General Orvil A. Anderson (who had been in the Air War Plans Division) and that only in an advisory capacity.
Anderson was the only one on the survey board who knew about procedures of strategic bombing as Jimmy Doolittle's former deputy commander of operations.
While the Board was not associated with any branch of the military, it was established by General Hap Arnold (chief of the USAF) along with Carl Spaatz (commander of Strategic Air Forces in Europe).
[2] The strategic bombing effort against Germany had begun at the start of the war with British attacks on German naval facilities.
After heavy losses in daylight raids, RAF Bomber Command moved to night attacks for protection from German fighter defences.
Formations of bombers flew in a mutually self-defensive "combat box" where their many machine guns would be sufficient to drive off or bring down enemy fighters.
[4] The 1943 Casablanca conference led to the Allied strategic bombing organisation: the USAAF would be working together with the RAF in the Combined Bomber offensive concentrating on particular areas of German industry but in such a way as their commanders interpreted their instructions.
Changes in tactics and availability of longer ranged fighters meant that the active Luftwaffe force was significantly diminished in early 1944 and the majority of the bombing offensive was directed instead against transport routes to prevent reinforcement of the defences there.
The Survey team was formed on 3 November 1944 by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson in response to a directive by President Roosevelt.
[8][9] The major conclusion of the report was that strategic bombing, particularly the destruction of the oil industry and truck manufacturing, had greatly contributed to the success of the Allies in World War II.
[10] The survey notes the effects on the German population: 3,600,000 "dwelling units", approximately 20% of total housing stock were "destroyed or heavily damaged" with an estimated 300,000 civilians killed and a further 780,000 wounded.
And concluded that "The great lesson to be learned in the battered towns of England and the ruined cities of Germany is that the best way to win a war is to prevent it from occurring.
During this time, they planned to "speedily extract bauxite, oil, rubber and metals from Malaya, Burma, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, and ship these materials to Japan for processing".
On the night of 9–10 March 1945, 16 square miles (41 km2) of eastern Tokyo were burned out and tens of thousands were killed by U.S. Army Air Forces B-29s in Operation Meetinghouse.
However, they also noted that production dropped by 54% during this period due to the effects of bombing: the killing, injuring and dehousing of the workers as well as the destruction of the transportation network.
The Survey stated that Japanese leaders were partially influenced by low civilian morale, but only to the extent that it warranted concerns about maintaining the ruling class.
The report also concluded that: "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.
"[23][24] Military historian Gian Gentile disputed this counterfactual, stating that testimony from Japanese leaders in USSBS interrogations supported the likelihood of Japan continuing the war beyond November and December 1945.
It was established for the purpose of conducting an impartial and expert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating air power as an instrument of military strategy, for planning the future development of the United States armed forces, and for determining future economic policies with respect to the national defense.
Three of the leaders of the European team were replaced for the research in Japan, so the accompanying table of "Officers of the Survey" includes fifteen men.
Those fifteen were selected as nonmilitary leaders, many of whom had even greater career success in supporting the development of strategic forces in the US military after the war than before.
“I defended it,” he later wrote, “with a maximum of arrogance and a minimum of tact.” ... Galbraith also visited Japan, where he analyzed the effect of the use of the atom bomb.
"'[29][30] The introduction to the summary report of air power in Europe noted that, "Allied air power was called upon to play many roles-partner with the Navy over the sea lanes; partner with the Army in ground battle; partner with both on the invasion beaches; reconnaissance photographer for all; mover of troops and critical supplies; and attacker of the enemy's vital strength far behind the battle line.
Grant (2008) said, "The survey began in no small part as a way to look at the major targeting controversies (rail vs. oil, and so forth) that had so often consumed the attention of top Allied planners and leaders.
"[citation needed] The survey reported that the rate of production of war materials by Germany actually increased in response to strategic bombing by the Allies.
[32] John Kenneth Galbraith, who was one of the "Officers" of the USSBS, wrote, "Nothing in World War II air operations was subject to such assault as open agricultural land."
[citation needed] Pape's conclusions were supported by a more formal quantitative analysis of a larger set of cases by Horowitz and Reiter (2001).
