The Commission, in passing the regulation, had allowed railroads 60 days to file statements of position on the matter.

Two railroad companies brought an action in the Middle District of Florida to set aside the per diem rates that had been established because they had only been allowed to make written submissions during "hearings" for the proposed rule and not oral arguments.

Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion, explaining that Section 1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act which had enlarged the Commission's authority to pass regulations "after hearing" was not a requirement that the ICC allow oral arguments in its rulemaking proceedings and that the hearing requirement had been met.

Since there had been no effort to single out a particular railroad, the court found the agency's action was of a basically legislative type judgment as opposed to an adjudication which could entail due process hearing rights.

The Court referred to its decision in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization in which it held that no hearing at all was constitutionally required prior to a decision by state tax officers in Colorado to increase the valuation of all taxable property in Denver by a substantial amount.