United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc.

By a 7–2 margin, the justices ruled that the exemption it had previously upheld for Major League Baseball was peculiar and unique to that sport and that it did not apply to boxing.

[1] Since it met the definition of interstate commerce, the government could therefore proceed with a trial to prove IBCNY and the other defendants had conspired to monopolize the market for championship boxing in the United States.

[5] Prior to the Court's consideration of Toolson, he recalled, Congress had considered and rejected other bills intended specifically to genericize the baseball exemption.

"[6] "It would baffle the subtlest ingenuity to find a single differentiating factor between other sporting exhibitions, whether boxing or football or tennis, and baseball", Frankfurter began.

[7] The Toolson majority, which he had been part of, had applied stare decisis, the legal doctrine under which flawed decisions can be upheld as the lesser of two evils.

I cannot translate even the narrowest conception of stare decisis into the equivalent of writing into the Sherman Law an exemption of baseball to the exclusion of every other sport different not one legal jot or tittle from it.

Unlike Frankfurter, he believed that boxing generally did not constitute interstate commerce, noting that the broadcasters and sponsors had not been named as defendants by the government, and that the Court was turning Federal Baseball's conclusion on its head.

The IBCNY appealed the divestitures proposed by the judge as having gone past the original offense, and that case came to the Supreme Court again as International Boxing Club of New York v. United States (358 U.S. 242 (1959)).

While they left boxing, they remained involved in professional sports as owners of the Chicago Blackhawks National Hockey League franchise.