After the end of the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 (Operation Bagration), the frontline of the Eastern Front had stabilised roughly in the middle of Poland, running from Riga on the Baltic coast over Warsaw via the Vistula to the Carpathian Mountains.

The Lower Silesian offensive operation, taking place in February, had seen the northern wing of Konev's forces make further gains, closing up to the Neisse River.

This had, however, left a long exposed flank to the south and east in the Sudeten Mountains, still held by Schulz's troops, which formed a potential threat to the proposed Soviet advance on Berlin.

[3] Despite the limited nature of the victory, the recapture of Lauban was presented as a great success by German propaganda, with Joseph Goebbels visiting the town on 9 March to give a speech on the battle.

Though there were not enough forces available for a double envelopment, the Germans were able to penetrate the Soviet lines and cut off elements of the 5th Guards Army on the night of 11–12 March; there was an outbreak of panic amongst the trapped troops, who were massacred by Schörner's men as they tried to escape.

[4] Schörner began to organise a more ambitious offensive to the north to relieve the besieged city of Breslau, moving Nehring's divisions northwards from Lauban by rail, but Konev acted decisively to regain the initiative in Silesia.

[11] The Upper Silesian Offensive succeeded in stabilising Konev's left flank in preparation for the advance on Berlin, and removed the threat of any German counter-attacks from Army Group Centre.