[3] Although the Vaal uprising marked the beginning of an open and sustained revolt, it was preceded by an "underground war"[2] or "series of localised confrontations",[4] for example clashes in Pietermaritzburg in 1982; in Durban and Mdantsane in 1983; and in Crossroads, Atteridgeville, Cradock, Tumahole, and the East Rand earlier in 1984.

[2] The uprising is named for the place it began: the black townships of the Vaal Triangle, an industrial area about 45 miles south of Johannesburg in Transvaal's PWV region.

Franziska Rueedi argues that at least some of the violence was partly premeditated: although the Vaal Civic Association intended the marches to be peaceful, there were other, more militant groupings who were not committed to non-violence.

[7] The South African Police responded initially with tear gas and rubber bullets, and then began using live ammunition; heavily armed reinforcements were brought in and continued to battle protestors overnight.

Both were affiliates of the UDF, a nationwide popular front of civic organisations which had been launched in August 1983 and which subsequently had played a leading role in boycotts of the 1984 general election.

"[2] On 23 October, military repression accelerated in earnest with the launch of Operation Palmiet (Afrikaans for "bullrush") in Sebokeng and three nearby townships, Sharpeville, Boipatong, and Bophelong.

As part of a campaign to "rid the area of criminal and revolutionary elements",[15] a heavily armed joint force of 7,000 police and SADF members cordoned off the townships and conducted a house-to-house search of about 19,500 houses, accommodating an estimated 225,000 people.

[15] 363 people were arrested by the end of the day, primarily for what the police called "minor crimes", but Trevor Manuel of the UDF warned that the house searches were pointless: "the authorities are looking for something they cannot find under beds or wardrobes.

[2] Almost immediately after troops completed their phased withdrawal from the Vaal on 24 October, a crowd of some 2,000 residents gathered in Sebokeng to confront the remaining police contingents, starting a fresh round of street fighting, while more than 70,000 children in the area launched an impromptu school boycott.

[2] According to Thula Simpson:In the following months this pattern was witnessed repeatedly: as the security forces deployed into a particular township, violent protest flared elsewhere; as they withdrew, unrest resumed where they had been.

In 1985, daily television images of confrontations between gun-wielding policemen and rock-throwing youths fuelled the debate in international circles over whether or not to impose sanctions on South Africa.

[2]On 27 October, at a meeting of 37 political, civic, and labour organisations in Johannesburg, COSAS reiterated a prior call for workers to support the youth's demands and oppose the heavy-handed state response to the uprising.

[17] The work-stoppage was accompanied in some areas by further violence and arson, met by police tear gas and rubber bullets; ten people were reported killed on the first day[18] and a further seven on the second.

[19] Morale was boosted by the successes of the Vaal uprising – the government had been forced to make certain concessions, removing local councillors to safety and suspending the rent increases – and militant vigour was piqued both by the severe state response and by the presence of troops in the townships, taken by some as a "declaration of war".

[22] The death toll of the uprising was at that point estimated at 450 fatalities, and Botha said the emergency would combat "acts of violence and thuggery... mainly directed at the property and person of law-abiding black people".

Critics of the government argued that this was deeply counterproductive, as the putative ringleaders were generally "simply the most articulate and experienced activists", the removal of whom "created a political vacuum into which unruly, undisciplined elements surged".

[2] In the phrase of the UDF's Murphy Morobe (speaking to press while in hiding to evade arrest), "Removing responsible leaders of the people has effectively paved the way for a blood bath".

[2] In addition, the orders stoked international concern; after the July 1985 announcement, the rand dropped to a record low, nearly matched in June 1986, and South African reserves were severely depleted.

[23] Nonetheless, the national state of emergency led to a sharp drop in reports of violence in the townships in subsequent months, in most accounts drawing the Vaal uprising to something approximating a conclusion;[7] by 1987, wide-scale unrest persisted most severely in the KwaNdebele bantustan and later, in a different form, in Natal.

The national state of emergency remained in place, renewed annually, until Botha's successor, F. W. de Klerk, announced in June 1990 that he would allow the decree to lapse everywhere but Natal.

[7][25] In the immediate aftermath of the 3 September riots, it was already evident that members of black local councils had been targeted; initial figures suggested that at least three councillors had been killed and the homes of several others subjected to arson attacks.

[8] Later analyses showed that attacks on property had, similarly, targeted government buildings and shops, vehicles, and houses owned by councillors and, to a lesser extent, by local black policemen.

[2] Skosana was rumoured to be the girlfriend and co-conspirator of Joe Mamasela, a notorious askari who had killed several Duduza youths by hand grenade in an entrapment operation in June.

[26][27] Widely attended, culturally important, and highly emotional, they often attracted rosters of guest speakers drawn from among the top rung of the internal anti-apartheid movement and were closely monitored by state security forces.

[4][12] As Colin Bundy observed, the establishment of local councils "succeeded in transforming aloof, physically distant agents of the state into identifiable individuals who lived and operated among those whom they ruled",[29] and who could therefore become the focal point for residents' anger.

[7] Some observers argued that, as the uprising continued, the strategies and aims of some participants changed, with many – particularly militant youth – setting their sights on the much larger goal of rendering the country "ungovernable" and, ultimately, that of dismantling apartheid through violence.

[2] Some analysts were attracted to the hypothesis that the uprising had been instigated or even planned by the African National Congress (ANC), an organisation which had played an important role in opposing apartheid before 1960, when it was banned by the government and went into exile in Lusaka, Zambia.

In 1979, the ANC's National Executive Committee had indeed endorsed a programme which included mass popular mobilisation inside South Africa, and its literature contained calls to reject the black local authorities.

To march forward must mean that we advance against the regime's organs of state-power, creating conditions in which the country becomes increasingly ungovernable... Having rejected the community councils by boycotting the elections, we should not allow them to be imposed on us.

From the outset, the UDF rejected le Grange's charge that it had been directly involved in revolt: on 10 October 1984, it called a press conference at which it condemned the "mischievous" allegations, distanced itself from the ANC, and reiterated its own commitment to non-violent methods.