"[1] He also told Kennedy that the USSR desired to negotiate with the U.S. on issues relating to "disarmament ... a German peace treaty ... and other questions which could bring about an easing and improvement of the entire international situation.
On February 22, 1961, Kennedy sent Khrushchev a letter stating, "I hope it will be possible, before too long, for us to meet personally for an informal exchange of views.
The American ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn E. Thompson, feared that Kennedy misjudged Khrushchev's personality and intentions.
Likewise, U.S. diplomat Charles Bohlen "worried that JFK underrated Khrushchev's determination to expand world communism.
Khrushchev understood Ulbricht's concern but feared that a potential intervention from Western powers would destabilize East Berlin further.
A peace treaty threatened the established balance of power and could potentially lead to the United States losing all its influence in East Berlin.
"As in Berlin, [Kennedy] inherited in Laos a situation aggravated by near-direct armed confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.
[7] In Laos, "the Eisenhower government committed millions of dollars in aid" in order to continue the rule of a pro-American leader.
On April 18, 1961, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a telegram that said, "Mr. President, I send you this message in an hour of alarm, fraught with danger for the peace of the whole world.
Khrushchev and Kennedy devoted a significant amount of time at the Vienna Summit to discussing the Berlin Crisis.
Khrushchev opened the conversation by expressing the Soviet perspective that a united Germany could lead to another World War.
Although Kennedy argued that the current balance of power in Germany was effective, Khrushchev said that "no force in the world would prevent the USSR from signing a peace treaty.
[11] Khrushchev remained firm in the fact that "the Soviet Union [would] sign [the peace treaty] in December if the U.S. [refused] an interim agreement.
"Without a firm Soviet commitment to stop supplying the guerrillas and to persuade the North Vietnamese to halt their efforts, nothing could be accomplished," Kennedy asserted.
[14] Seymour Topping's article on "Khrushchev and Vienna" ran in The New York Times on June 3—the day before the conference began.
Kennedy later said of Khrushchev, "He beat the hell out of me" and told New York Times reporter James 'Scotty' Reston immediately afterwards it was the "worst thing in my life.
Even though we came to no concrete agreement, I could tell that [Kennedy] was interested in finding a peaceful solution to world problems and avoiding conflict with the Soviet Union.
"[19] In addition to conveying US reluctance to defend the full rights of Berlin's citizens, Kennedy ignored his own cabinet officials' advice to avoid ideological debate with Khrushchev.