Virtue epistemology
It is characterized by efforts to solve problems of special concern to modern epistemology, such as justification and reliabilism, by focusing on the knower as agent in a manner similar to how virtue ethics focuses on moral agents rather than moral acts.
The area has a parallel in the theory of Unity of knowledge and action proposed by Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming.
Ernest Sosa introduced intellectual virtue into contemporary epistemological discussion in a 1980 paper called "The Raft and the Pyramid".
[2] Sosa argued that an appeal to intellectual virtue could resolve the conflict between foundationalists and coherentists over the structure of epistemic justification.
On the other hand, foundationalism arguably encounters a problem[further explanation needed] when it attempts to describe how foundational beliefs relate to the sensory experiences that support them.
[3] As a result of Gettier's counterexamples, competing theories were developed, but the disputes between coherentists and foundationalists proved to be intractable.
[clarification needed] Some virtue epistemologists use reliabilism as a basis for belief justification, stressing reliable functioning of the intellect.
Virtue epistemology attempts to simplify the analysis of knowledge by replacing certain abstractions involved in the pursuit[clarification needed] of the highest[how?]
John Greco, another advocate of virtue reliabilism, believes that knowledge and justified belief "are grounded in stable and reliable cognitive character.
So long as such habits are both stable and successful, they make up the kind of character that gives rise to knowledge.
Some, such as Lorraine Code, think that intellectual virtues involve having the correct cognitive character and epistemic relation to the world rooted in a social context.
"[13] As she sees it, the "characteristic motivation" of an intellectual virtue is the desire for truth, understanding, and other species of cognitive contact with reality.
The notion of "reliable success" is invoked in order to avoid issues of well-intentioned but unsuccessful agents who desire truth but use poorly suited methods to pursue it.
Alvin Plantinga offers another theory of knowledge closely related to virtue epistemology.
According to Kvanvig, true belief is what is necessary to maximize truth and to avoid error, thus dropping justification from the equation of knowledge.
Others, such as Sosa's account, can circumvent Cartesian skepticism with the necessity of externalism interacting with internalism.
Reliabilists might characterize this as effecting a drop in reliable functioning, whereas responsibilists would see these variations as negating one's excellent cognitive character.
