Vote counting

In the United States, the compilation of election returns and validation of the outcome that forms the basis of the official results is called canvassing.

Computers are at least that accurate, except when they have undiscovered bugs, broken sensors scanning the ballots, paper misfeeds, or hacks.

Paper ballots and computer files of results are stored until they are tallied, so they need secure storage, which is hard.

The absence of error and fraud is partially attributable to the inherent checks and balances in the voting process itself, which are, as with democracy, built into the system to reduce their likelihood.

[6] These first two methods do not preserve the original order of the ballots, which can interfere with matching them to tallies or digital images taken earlier.

[10] [11] The fact that different parties and citizens count with independent systems protects against errors from bugs and hacks.

[26] Repeated tests have found that the tedious and repetitive nature of hand counting leads to a loss of focus and accuracy over time.

Only the net result for each candidate in each town could be measured, by assuming the careful manual recount was fully accurate.

[32] India hand tallies paper records from a 1.5% sample of election machines before releasing results.

Optical scan ballots, which were tallied by both methods, averaged 1.87% errors, equally divided between undercounts and overcounts.

Participants thought that having the candidate names printed in larger type and bolder than the office and party would make hand tallies faster and more accurate.

In the US only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia give anyone but officials a legal right to see ballot marks during hand counting.

[43] In 1934, the United States had been hand-counting ballots for over 150 years, and problems were described in a report by Joseph P. Harris, who 20 years later invented a punched card voting machine,[44] "Recounts in Chicago and Philadelphia have indicated such wide variations that apparently the precinct officers did not take the trouble to count the ballots at all...

[66] When not maintained well the counters can stick and stop counting additional votes; staff may or may not choose to fix the problem.

Where the election commission is weaker, expensive machines can be fetishized, waste money on kickbacks and divert attention, time and resources from harmful practices, as well as reducing transparency.

[69] In an optical scan voting system, or marksense, each voter's choices are marked on one or more pieces of paper, which then go through a scanner.

The voter may mark the paper directly, usually in a specific location for each candidate, either by filling in an oval or by using a patterned stamp that can be easily detected by OCR software.

The paper ballots and electronic memories still need to be stored, to check that the images are correct, and to be available for court challenges.

Researchers find security flaws in all election computers, which let voters, staff members or outsiders disrupt or change results, often without detection.

Researchers say that the steady flow of income from past sales, combined with barriers to entry, reduces the incentive for vendors to improve voting technology.

The authors say extra machine maintenance would exacerbate that difference, and printing cost would be comparable in both approaches.

Voting data and ballot images are recorded in memory components, and can be copied out at the end of the election.

The system may also provide a means for communicating with a central location for reporting results and receiving updates,[100] which is an access point for hacks and bugs to arrive.

The tally of the voting data is stored in a removable memory component and in bar codes on the paper tape.

In the US only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia give anyone but officials a legal right to see ballot marks during hand counting.

[39] For optical scans, the software has rules to interpret voter intent, based on the darkness of marks.

[76] Software may ignore circles around a candidate name, and paper dust or broken sensors can cause marks to appear or disappear, not where the voter intended.

[117] Security recommendations include preventing access by anyone alone,[122] which would typically require two hard-to-pick locks, and having keys held by independent officials if such officials exist in the jurisdiction; having storage risks identified by people other than those who design or manage the system; and using background checks on staff.

[123] Starting the tally soon after voting ends makes it feasible for independent parties to guard storage sites.

The voter may be forced or paid to vote a certain way,[38] or ballots may be changed or lost during the delivery process,[126] [127] or delayed so they arrive too late to be counted or for signature mis-matches to be resolved.