One of the sticking points in the negotiations was North Vietnam's insistence that there should be a ceasefire in place, with the PAVN and Vietcong (VC) retaining control of the areas they occupied.

South Vietnamese president Nguyễn Văn Thiệu opposed the continued PAVN occupation, but was coerced by the Nixon Administration to agree to this condition.

The regiment was apparently deployed to protect the PAVN logistics hub of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the A Sầu Valley and Route 9.

South of Huế, the PAVN 5th and 6th Regiments attacked the lowlands around Phu Bai Combat Base, gaining temporary control of several hamlets before being ejected and losing 175 killed.

Subsequent ARVN operations recovered some of these outlying villages and hamlets; the final result probably correctly reflected the relative military balance and political influence in the area.

[2]: 23 In Quảng Tín Province the PAVN 711th Division was committed to defending its important base area in the Hiệp Đức District and played no offensive role.

On 16 January the 3rd Division commander Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh, committed the 51st Regiment to continue the attack to seize the former Firebase West on Hill 1460 (15°35′06″N 108°11′35″E / 15.585°N 108.193°E / 15.585; 108.193) guarding the eastern approach to Hiệp Đức.

Meanwhile, elements of the 3rd Division's 2nd Regiment were across the Quế Sơn Valley and had seized the hill above Chau Son, thus controlling Route 534 into Hiệp Đức.

In southern Quảng Ngai, the PAVN 52nd Regiment, 2nd Division, established defenses around the district town of Ba Tơ, which it had controlled since the fall of 1972.

South Vietnamese intelligence determined that the PAVN's objectives were to isolate the northern districts of Bình Định, hold the ARVN 22nd Division in its bases, cut Highway 1 and gain control of as much land and as many people as possible.

From the PAVN viewpoint the prospects for success seemed good, for large segments of the population in the coastal areas of Bình Định and Phú Yên had long been sympathetic to the VC, and the ARVN 22nd Division had yet to establish any reputation for excellence in battle.

[2]: 24 Fighting started in northeast Bình Định on 23 January 1973, when elements of the PAVN 12th Regiment, 3rd Division, moved from bases in the An Lão valley toward the Tam Quan lowlands.

Although contacts were light and scattered in Khánh Hòa Province, the PAVN/VC succeeded in interdicting Highway 21, temporarily isolating Ban Me Thuot from the coast.

[2]: 24 Although the PAVN/VC seemed to enjoy great chances for success in Bình Định and Phú Yên Provinces, it was clear by the first week of February that they had failed to achieve any significant gains and the PAVN/VC forces had incurred extremely heavy losses.

Objectives assigned to PAVN/VC forces in B3 Front were similar to those in southern MR 5: to hold the ARVN 23rd Division in place, isolate the cities of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot and interdict the main highways.

The PAVN/VC waited until the night of 26 January to make their moves into the hamlets and villages, and not until the morning of the ceasefire did the attacks reach full intensity.

[2]: 24 On 26 January, in coordination with the Polei Krong and Trung Nghia attack, the 95B Regiment, 10th Division, seized Highway 14 where it traversed the Chu Pao Pass and held on until 10 February.

The most important gain was the recapture of Đức Cơ in time to receive the ICCS, this achievement aside, by mid-February the military balance in the highlands was generally the same as it had been at the end of December 1972.

[2]: 25 The PAVN's Eastern Nam Bo Region was roughly the same as South Vietnam's III Corps (Bình Tuy, Gia Định, Hậu Nghĩa and Long An Provinces were excluded).

In addition to scheduling attacks close to the ceasefire date, the PAVN in October 1972 had also learned that it lacked the strength to infiltrate the Saigon area with main forces.

[2]: 25 At the end of the first two weeks in January, ARVN III Corps began an attack into the Saigon River corridor and advanced all the way to Tri Tam in the Michelin Rubber Plantation.

[2]: 26 In keeping with the PAVN goal of political control, terrorist attacks during the brief campaign were few, apparently on the theory that widespread terrorism would antagonize the people.

The PAVN's political objectives were not achieved, the attempt to seize Tây Ninh never approached success, and RF/PF forces were able to clear the PAVN/VC from out lying hamlets with only minimal assistance from the ARVN.

Highway 4 from the southwestern Delta to Saigon crossed the center of Định Tường, and the area around Mỹ Tho, the capital, was densely populated.

Having already established control in the U Minh Forest, they could anchor the terminus of an infiltration corridor from Cambodia through Kiên Giang into the lower Delta, but because of Operation Dong Khoi none of these goals would be realized.

[2]: 26–7 In eastern Định Tường and Gò Công Provinces a prisoner reported that main forces, including the PAVN 88th and 24th Regiments, were to break down into small units and conduct political activity among the population.

The Delta capital and the headquarters for the ARVN IV Corps was at Cần Thơ in the central Mekong province of Phong Dinh.

[2]: 27 The PAVN's 44th Sapper Regiment, also subordinate to the 1st Division, began operations in the Seven Mountains of Châu Đốc on 15 January with attacks by fire against South Vietnamese posts.

The 44th moved into the Seven Mountains near Tri Tôn on 23 January to occupy as much territory and gain control of as much population as possible, but ARVN counter-operations again prevented any significant successes.

U.S. observers at MACV in Saigon attributed the PAVN's failures to tactical errors, the limited capabilities of the local forces and an outstanding performance by the South Vietnamese.