[3] The plans for the Allied invasion of Sicily, extent of military force, the date for invading Normandy, and the progress of the Pacific War were discussed.
The main topics that were discussed were the Italian Campaign, the amount of military force that should be used, the Normandy landings, and how to help China in the Pacific War.
Churchill felt that the extent of the operations and their priority could be solved by mutual agreement,[5] and consensus was reached on all issues.
This was because the US and the UK speculated that they could build up troop strength, produce more landing craft and supplies, and thus ensure complete command of air and sea by doing so.
[5] The Trident Conference shows a change in domination over world leadership, as the Americans were influential over other countries.
[4] In particular, US Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall led this change to increase the role of the Americans in the war effort, which had been previously dominated by Britain.
[10] According to Max Hastings, Alan Brooke's reputation as a strategist was "significantly damaged" by his remarks at the Trident Conference, where he claimed that no major operations on the continent would be possible until 1945 or 1946.
[11] Brooke's diary says that he wanted "operations in the Mediterranean to force a dispersal of German forces, help Russia, and thus eventually produce a situation where cross Channel operations are possible" but that Churchill entirely repudiated (or half repudiated) the paper the CCOS had agreed on; Harry Hopkins got him to withdraw his proposed amendments.