The remaining buildings either use cesspools and septic tanks or simply release raw sewage directly into the environment.

[11] According to the World Bank, the Lebanese water supply and sanitation sector has not achieved service provision in line with the country's level of economic development.

[19] According to a 1998 study by the National Council of Scientific Research of Lebanon for UNICEF 60–70% percent of all natural sources were affected by bacterial contamination.

The most frequently cited reasons for not drinking public water are perception of safety relating to health and hygiene, and poor taste.

[15] The government plans to tap the Awali River to the Southeast of Beirut to provide the growing capital with 90 million m3/year of additional water, more than double the current resources.

Compared to the substantial investment in infrastructure, little effort was made at building the capacity of sector institutions and at establishing policies that favor the sustainability and improve the quality of services provided.

The limited sewer networks, if they existed at all, were managed by the respective municipalities, which had often even less technical and financial capacity than the water authorities.

Because the construction of sewers was delayed, most of the sewage of Southern Beirut still flowed into the Mediterranean without any treatment via both the Al Ghadir River and sea outlets.

[30] The donors thus pressed for a sector reform that would create commercially oriented regional water and sanitation companies that would achieve economies of scale.

According to a 2010 World Bank ten years after the Water Law has been passed it "has not been fully enforced and implemented, thus creating institutional uncertainty over sector responsibilities".

Furthermore, "the four RWEs severely lack managerial and financial autonomy and are impeded by limited inter-agency coordination and weak central government oversight.

They have not been able to effectively operate and maintain water supply networks, fully engage with the private sector, recover costs and hire qualified staff".

[31] The private company increased the billing efficiency from 30% to 60%, reduced water rationing, mapped the network, updated the customer inventory, computerized the accounting system and trained staff.

[33] The contract faced a number of challenges: According to a study by the French Institute for Public-Private Partnerships, the supervisory committee was composed of former employees of the public water company who were not convinced of the usefulness of private sector participation.

In addition, the Council of the South and the Central Fund for the Displaced have financed almost half of all investments in water supply in Lebanon during the late 1990s and early 2000s.

[41] The Council for the South, nominally under the Primer Minister's Office, is controlled by the mostly Shiite Amal Movement of Nabih Berri, the speaker of Lebanon's Parliament since 1992.

Assuming an average-size household with 4.5 members that receives 100 liter per capita per day, the price of water is almost US$1/m3 in Beirut and US$0.66/m3 in the Bekaa.

The collection rate (i.e. the shares of bills actually paid) in Beirut-Mount Lebanon has been consistent at almost 90%, so that the utility had accumulated over US$170 million as cash surplus in 2010.

The dialogue, which included NGOs and the private sector in addition to government representatives and donors, was kicked off by a meeting in November 2005.

Under a 2m Euro loan the water distribution network in the Southern town of Jezzine was rehabilitated after the retreat of the Israeli army in 1999.

Another 12m Euro loan was approved in 2001 to build an "emergency" bulk water supply line and to rehabilitate distribution networks in the Southern towns of Nabah El Tasseh and Jabal Amel.

In 2007 AFD approved a small grant to rehabilitate the water network of the Southern town of Bkassine with co-financing provided by the French city Lille.

Among other activities, it systematically collected data on performance indicators (benchmarking), prepared business plans, valued fixed assets and identified all customers.

[53] The German public disaster relief organization Technisches Hilfswerk (THW), which works mainly through volunteers, provided emergency assistance in the South only days after the 2006 hostilities ended.

[60] The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has provided 55m Kuwaiti Dinar (US$187m) in soft loans (2.5% interest, 24–30 years maturity) for water supply and sanitation between 1993 and 2010.

It attempted to replicate the positive experience in the South to the Beirut/Mount Lebanon Water Establishment, but faced difficulties there because of a lack of support from management.

[64][65] The World Bank has supported the Lebanese water and sanitation sector since 1993 when it approved an Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project.

The project also rehabilitated or expanded three large water productions and distribution systems and wastewater treatment plants Baalbek, Metn and Barouk.

This was followed by a US$15m emergency grant in 2007 to support the rehabilitation and expansion of water supply systems in five villages in the Western Bekaa Valley.

For example, NGOs such as the YMCA, the Mercy Corps, CHF International and the Pontifical Mission built 13 small wastewater treatment plants throughout the country during the 1990s with funding from USAID.