Wehrmachtbericht
Despite the latter's attempts to temper excessive optimism, they often exaggerated the success of the German armed forces, the Wehrmacht, leading historian Aristotle Kallis to describe their tone as "triumphalist".
[2][3] During World War II, the Wehrmacht communiqué (Wehrmachtbericht ) was the official news communication medium about the military situation of the Reich, and was intended for both domestic and foreign consumption.
The propaganda companies were the only news-reporting units in areas of military operation, as civilian news correspondents were prohibited from entering combat zones.
[10] In the summer of 1941, during Operation Barbarossa, the communiqués created an image of uninterrupted successful advances by Germany deep into the Soviet territory, with historian Aristotle Kallis describing the tone of the early Wehrmacht reports as "triumphalist".
This metamorphosis of the truth from "all shit" to "it was a victory" baffled me, and those of my comrades who dared to think.Starting in August 1941, when it became clear to some in the Propaganda Ministry and the Wehrmacht high command that the war would likely extend into 1942, Goebbels grew increasingly concerned about the triumphant tone of the communiques.
[12] Because of the competing goals, approaches and chains of command, along with the chaotic nature of the regime itself, the propaganda materials produced by Goebbels's ministry, the OKW and Hitler's press chief, Otto Dietrich, did not always agree in tone or assessment of the situation.
[12] After the assault on Moscow, Operation Typhoon, began on 2 October 1941, Goebbels described in his diary the "excessive optimism" that was developing in the population after the announcements about the initial rapid advance of the German forces.
Concerned about an "almost illusionistic" mood, he instructed the press to adopt a more cautious approach and spoke to Jodl about tempering down the tone of the Wehrmacht communiqués.
[13] The Wehrmachtbericht communiqués around the 1942 summer campaign and the defeat of the German army in the Battle of Stalingrad provide another case study on their effects on Germany's population and the evolution of the propaganda efforts themselves.
The communiqués were factual and restrained; nevertheless, Goebbels issued instructions to the German press to exercise "cautious optimism" so as not to set expectations too high among the population.
[15] From 24 November onward, the Wehrmacht communiqués began acknowledging the Soviet breakthrough and described "heavy fighting", but provided no references to the encirclement.
[16] Despite occasional mis-alignment of messages, with the tone of the Wehrmacht communiqués being too exuberant for Goebbels, a self-described "realist",[12] the relations between the military and civilian propaganda organizations proved successful throughout the war.
[5] From the onset, according to historian Daniel Uziel, the Nazi propaganda machine regarded the Wehrmacht communiqués as "possessing a future value, besides the immediate use as news delivery medium".
He can start to work bravely and confidently the bitterest hour of our history, for the eternal life of our people.Those words were intended for public consumption by the now-defeated nation.
[18] As an award, the named reference in the Wehrmachtbericht was based on the Walther von Brauchitsch decree of 27 April 1940 which was published in the Heeres-Verordnungsblatt (Army Ordinance Gazette) on 6 May 1940.
