The British Western Desert Force (renamed Cyrcom and later the Eighth Army) had been reduced in early 1941 to send units to Greece, rather than complete the conquest of Libya, just as German troops and Italian reinforcements arrived.

The Axis never overcame the supply constraints limiting the size of their land and air forces in North Africa and the desert war became a sideshow for Germany, when the expected quick conclusion of Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, was not achieved.

The Italian navy had prospered under the Fascist regime, which had paid for fast, well-built, well-armed ships and a large submarine fleet but it lacked experience and training.

[5] The war was fought primarily in the area known as the Western Desert, which was about 240 mi (390 km) wide, from Mersa Matruh in Egypt to Gazala on the Libyan coast, along Litoranea Balbo (Via Balbia), the only paved road.

[7] Bedouin tracks linked wells and the more easily traversed ground; navigation was by sun, star, compass and "desert sense", good perception of the environment gained by experience.

[8] The sirocco (gibleh or ghibli), a hot desert wind, blows clouds of fine sand, which reduce visibility to a few metres and coat eyes, lungs, machinery, food and equipment; motor vehicles and aircraft need special oil filters and the barren terrain means that supplies for military operations have to be transported from outside.

[10] Italian supply shipments to Libya went about 600 mi (970 km) west around Sicily, then approached the coast of Tunisia before going on to Tripoli, in order to avoid interference from the British aircraft, ships and submarines based at Malta.

The Germans assumed that the maximum distance a motorised army could operate from its base was 200 mi (320 km) but on average about a third of Axis lorries were unserviceable and 35–50 per cent of the fuel deliveries were consumed transporting the remainder to the front.

[13] Once the Italians declared war in 1940 and until 1943, merchant ships travelled east from Britain around the Cape of Good Hope, which made Egypt as distant as Australia and New Zealand.

The Middle East Supply Centre (MESC) operated in Egypt, Palestine and Syria to co-ordinate imports and create local substitutes for civilian rations and promote agricultural efficiencies.

Two days later, the British raided a convoy on the Tobruk–Bardia road, killed 21 Italian soldiers and took 88 prisoners, including Generale di Brigata (Brigadier-General) Romolo Lastrucci, the 10th Army Chief Engineer.

[25] The Italian invasion of Egypt on 13–18 September began as a limited tactical operation towards Mersa Matruh, rather than the strategic objectives sketched in Rome, due to the chronic lack of transport, fuel and wireless equipment, even with resupply from the 5th Army.

[35] On 9 February, Churchill ordered the advance to stop and troops to be dispatched to Greece to take part in Operation Marita of the Greco-Italian War, since a German attack through Macedonia was thought imminent.

[38] A week after the Italian surrender at Beda Fomm, the Defence Committee in London ordered Cyrenaica held with the minimum of forces and all spare troops sent to Greece.

Adolf Hitler responded to the Italian disaster with Directive 22 (11 January) ordering Unternehmen Sonnenblume (Operation Sunflower), the deployment of a new Afrika Korps (DAK) to Libya, as a Sperrverband (barrier detachment).

[49] The pass was defended by the 3rd Coldstream Guards of Lieutenant-Colonel Moubray and supporting units but the bluff became a genuine attack and secured a commanding position, leaving the British in danger of being surrounded.

Rommel ordered the panzer divisions to relieve the Axis positions on the Egyptian border but failed to find the main body of the Allied infantry, which had bypassed the fortresses and headed for Tobruk.

Lack of deliveries coupled with the Eighth Army offensive forced a retreat to El Agheila from 4 December, crowding the Via Balbia, where British ambushes destroyed about half of the remaining Axis transport.

[66] The British planned Operation Buckshot for June to destroy the Panzerarmee and re-capture Cyrenaica but in early May defensive measures on the Egyptian border took priority, as an Axis attack became imminent.

[82][83][c] Rommel wished to attack, having refitted the force in Libya, to forestall an Eighth Army offensive, which was agreed by Hitler and Mussolini, with the proviso that an advance would stop at Tobruk, ready for the invasion of Malta in August.

After four days Rommel called off the attempt due to the strength of the Eighth Army defence, depleted Axis supplies and dwindling forces, with German divisions down to 1,200–1,500 men each.

In the Battle of Alam el Halfa (Unternehmen Brandung, 30 August – 5 September), Axis units sought to surround the Eighth Army by advancing around its southern flank.

Allied aircraft bombed and strafed Axis troops continuously from 30 August to 4 September, which destroyed few tanks but pinned them down and denied fast manoeuvring and concentration to the Panzerarmee.

On 4 November, the Eighth Army broke through Axis defences and Rommel ordered the retreat to begin, abandoning the non-motorized units, particularly Italian formations, in the centre and south.

The Axis forces retreated along the coast road but lack of tanks and fuel for a mobile defence of the open southern flank, made a stand at the Halfaya Pass or any other position impossible.

[99] Panzerarmee Afrika retired to the El Agheila defences (Mersa Brega line) but Axis supply and reinforcement priority was given to the forces opposing the British First Army (Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson) and Operation Torch, leaving the Italo-Germans with no capacity to counter-attack.

Hitler ordered the Mersa Brega line to be held at all costs but Rommel favoured a fighting retreat to the Gabès Gap in Tunisia, which would increase the supply distance for the Eighth Army to 1,500 mi (2,400 km).

On the eve of the Second Battle of El Alamein, the railway from Tobruk flooded and 10,000 long tons (10,160 t) of supplies were stranded, leaving the Panzerarmee with only ten per cent of the fuel it needed.

The 7th Armoured Division entered Tripoli on 23 January; the last elements of Panzerarmee reached the Mareth line, another 200 mi (320 km) west, on 15 February, as LRDG patrols surveyed the defences.

Creveld disagreed, since only the German occupation of southern France after Operation Torch made French merchant ships and Toulon available for dispatch and Bizerta available for receipt, which did not apply in 1941.