Woodhead Commission

It preferred a modification of the partition, which forms a satisfactory basis of settlement, if the United Kingdom government accept "the very considerable financial liability involved,"[4] that balances the Arab state budget.

It published its conclusions on November 9, 1938, after which the British government rejected the imminent partition of Palestine as involving insurmountable "political, administrative and financial difficulties".

The Arabs renewed their revolt after the publication of the Peel Commission report and the British Cabinet, taking fright, secretly voted against partition on 8 December 1937.

[11] In accordance with a decision of the British cabinet, Woodhead was secretly advised that it was within the commission's authority to decide that "no workable scheme could be produced".

No Arabs came forward to submit evidence, though king Abdullah of Transjordan wrote to Woodhead giving support for partition as well as receiving the Commission in Amman.

[22] Plan C, a further modification, would reduce the Jewish State to the coastal region between Zikhron Yaakov and Rehovot, while placing northern Palestine, including the Jezreel Valley, and all the semi-arid part of southern Palestine, under a separate mandate[21][23] to be administered by the mandatory until the Arab and Jewish populations could agree on their final destination.

This plan was a modification of the partition, which would form a satisfactory basis of settlement, if the United Kingdom was prepared to provide a sufficient assistance to enable the Arab State to balance its budget.

"[31] It found that "it is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of a self-supporting Arab State.

"[33] The Commission proposed a modified form of partition called "economic federalism" in which the two states would enter into a customs union with the territories that remained under mandate, leaving the Mandatory authorities to determine a fiscal policy.

This arrangement could be extended, if desired, to cover internal communications (railways, posts and telegraphs) thus removing certain obvious administrative difficulties consequent on partition.

The attempt of the Woodhead Commission to include the fewest Arabs in Jewish areas and vice versa led to plans that were not viable.

Moreover, the implication was that a self-supporting Arab state must "continue to enjoy those amenities that Jewish enterprise and taxation had brought to undivided Palestine."

As a consequence, the government issued a policy statement that "the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable.

Map illustrating Jewish proposals for partition of Jerusalem, presented to the Woodhead Commission
Woodhead Commission, Plan A
Woodhead Commission, Plan B
Woodhead Commission, Plan C