They gave Lan high marks for his "perceptiveness and dexterity in civil affairs and troop morale" but saw his interest in local politics as too distracting.

[1]: 115–6 In early May 1966 General Westmoreland suggested a "buddy" effort, matching the US 173d Airborne Brigade and the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) with the division.

[4]: 39 In June 1969 the new II Field Force commander Lt. Gen. Julian Ewell initiated the Dong Tien (or "Progress Together") Program with III Corps commander, General Đỗ Cao Trí, to "buddy up US and ARVN units to conduct combined operations [that would]... maximize the effectiveness of both forces [and] achieve in 2, 3, or 4 months a quantum jump in ARVN and RF/PF performance."

The US 199th Light Infantry Brigade moved to Xuan Loc, headquarters of the division, and began a series of combined operations with what was still considered one of the worst units in the ARVN.

[1]: 409–11 In July 1969, Major General Roderick Wetherill, the IV Corps senior adviser, suggested deploying elements of the division out of the placid Saigon area and into the delta border regions where they might pick up some useful combat experience, however, Ewell treated the proposal as a joke saying "the 18th couldn't hit the ground with their hat in Delta terrain against the VC" and insisted they stay at home, out of harm's way.

"[1]: 365 On 20 September 1971 the division base camp located 2 km west of Tây Ninh received 50 82 mm mortar rounds followed by a sapper attack by an estimated PAVN battalion.

[10]: 101–5 On 9 December in response to the PAVN 812th Regiment attack on Tánh Linh District III Corps ordered the division, with the 7th Ranger Group attached, from Xuân Lộc to reinforce the territorials in Bình Tuy Province.

When the 32d Ranger Battalion fell into a well-laid ambush along Route 333 and sustained heavy casualties, it became clear that the PAVN 33rd Regiment was not going to permit the reinforcement of Bình Tuy to proceed without a fight.

Although outposts still in ARVN hands, as well as Hoai Duc and Tánh Linh were receiving heavy indirect fire, General Dư Quốc Đống, commanding III Corps ordered the division not try to press forward past Gia Huynh on Route 333.

Meanwhile, the PAVN blew a bridge south of Hoai Duc, occupied Vo Xu, and increased the intensity of its attack on Tánh Linh.

While two battalions of the 48th Regiment held their positions on Route 333 north of Gia Ray, the tired and depleted 7th Ranger Group was withdrawn to Binh Duong Province to rest and refit.

Since all available battalions of the division had been committed, the JGS moved the 4th Ranger Group from Kontum to Long Binh where it was rested and re-equipped and made available to Đống as a reserve.

The PAVN 33rd Regiment, its ranks also depleted during an intense, month-long campaign, still held roadblocks along Route 333 in mid-January but was feeling the pressure of the division battalions pushing in both directions along the road.

During the last week of January 1975, the ARVN had the road cleared from Gia Ray to Hoai Duc and by February had reoccupied the village of Vo Xu.

The Bình Tuy campaign was over, losses had been high for both sides and the remote eastern sector of the province remained in PAVN control.

[10]: 167 The PAVN began their Long Khánh-Bình Tuy campaign with strong attacks against ARVN positions on the two principal lines of communication in the region, Highways 1 and 20 striking outposts, towns, bridges and culverts north and east of Xuan Loc.

The PAVN assault was repulsed with heavy losses on both sides, and another RF company, sent to reinforce, ran into strong resistance on Highway 1 west of Ong Don.

North from Xuan Loc, on Route 20, hamlets along the road were occupied in varying degrees by PAVN soldiers, and the territorial outpost far to the northeast near the Lam Dong boundary was overrun.

Đảo decided to counterattack up Route 20 with his 52nd Regiment, minus one battalion but reinforced with the 5th Armored Cavalry Squadron from Tay Ninh Province.

The regiment was ordered to clear the road as far as Định Quán, but the attack quickly stalled as it met heavy resistance well short of its objective.

[10]: 167–9 Evidence of increasing heavy PAVN commitments in Long Khánh flowed into III Corps headquarters in Bien Hoa.

Toàn responded to the burgeoning threat on his eastern flank first by sending the 5th Armored Cavalry Squadron and then one battalion of the 48th Regiment from Tay Ninh to Long Khánh.

The 3rd Battalion made contact with a PAVN company west of the Vàm Cỏ Đông River on 17 March, killed 36, and captured a number of weapons.

The 52nd Regiment meanwhile was pressing forward on Route 20 south of Định Quán and in sharp fighting on 1 April killed over 50 PAVN troops.

The PAVN attacked the rear base of the 52nd Regiment on Route 20, the 43rd Infantry in Xuân Lộc and the 82nd Ranger Battalion on 11 April, the third day of the battle.

At that time the battalion of the 48th Regiment securing Hàm Tân went back to Xuân Lộc and the 1st Airborne Brigade moved in closer to the town.

The PAVN continued sending additional forces into III Corps with the 320B and 325th Divisions moving to Long Khánh where they entered the battle on 15 April.

The 1st Airborne Brigade, frustrated in its attack toward Xuân Lộc, withdrew through the plantations and jungles toward Bà Rịa in Phước Tuy Province.

Brigadier General Trần Quang Khôi, commander of the 3rd Armored was given responsibility for defending Bien Hoa, although PAVN shelling had rendered the base unusable.

[11]: 488–90  The 3rd Armored was moving from Bien Hoa to attack PAVN forces when they heard the surrender broadcast of President Dương Văn Minh and Khôi halted his advance and disbanded the unit.