This situation was exacerbated by confusing orders, lack of command and control, and a well-led and aggressive enemy, which led to the utter rout and destruction of the bulk of South Vietnamese forces in the Central Highlands.

South Vietnamese forces regrouped around the capital and defended the key transportation hubs at Phan Rang and Xuân Lộc, but a loss of political and military will to continue the fight became ever more manifest.

General Văn Tiến Dũng, PAVN chief of staff, and Defence Minister Võ Nguyên Giáp strongly urged the resumption of conventional military operations, warning that increasing passivity would affect the morale of the army.

It was first decided that an attack in the Central Highlands would have the greatest chance of success, but this concept was challenged by Lieutenant General Trần Văn Trà, COSVN's military commander.

[32] During the same period, the North Vietnamese were recovering from losses incurred during the Easter Offensive of 1972 by replacing personnel and modernizing their equipment with a new influx of Soviet and Chinese military aid.

[35] The PAVN high command also recognized the need for improvements to their logistical network to facilitate the transport of sufficient supplies of food, weapons, and ammunition necessary for continuous large-scale operations.

By 1973 the 559th Transportation Group, which controlled the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southeastern Laos, was ordered to expand east of the Trường Sơn Mountains and directly into South Vietnam.

[36] One of the most threatening features of the new North Vietnamese build-up was the air defense network that was established within South Vietnam, which by 1975 consisted of twenty-two regiments equipped with radar-controlled gun systems and formidable SA-2 Guideline and shoulder-launched SA-7 Grail anti-aircraft missiles.

From his headquarters at Biên Hòa, Lieutenant General Dư Quốc Đống, the III Corps commander, augmented this force by sending in the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division, two artillery sections, and three reconnaissance companies.

Phước Long City and province would be surrendered to PAVN forces as a matter of expediency, since it was considered to be strategically less important than Tây Ninh, Pleiku, or Huế – economically, politically, and demographically.

"[48] Word of the fall of Phước Long reached the North Vietnamese Politburo in the midst of its Twenty-third Plenum, and the body immediately ordered the General Staff to develop a follow-up plan.

Phú was deceived by an elaborate North Vietnamese communications charade and his belief that PAVN movements toward Buôn Ma Thuột were diversionary operations designed to distract him from the true objective, Pleiku.

On the 13th, the ARVN 44th Regiment, 23rd Division and a battalion of the 21st Ranger Group were helilifted to Phuoc An, 20 miles (32 km) east of Buôn Ma Thuột, to form a relief force for the beleaguered city.

In the final analysis, the blame for the fall of the highlands lies with General Phú, who refused to act on sound intelligence and when he realized his error, it was too late to get reinforcements to the scene.

[citation needed] Realising the weakened state of his army, President Thiệu sent a delegation to Washington in early March to request an increase in economic and military aid.

Ambassador to South Vietnam Graham Martin, who believed additional aid would help the defense of the Republic, also made a trip to Washington to present the case to President Gerald R. Ford.

[57] The Ford administration, from the president on down, however, continued to encourage Thiệu in what the historian Arnold Isaacs called "the pipe dream that Congress would restore the funds it cut.

After reviewing the military situation, Thiệu pulled out a small-scale map of South Vietnam and discussed the possible redeployment of the armed forces to "hold and defend only those populous and flourishing areas which were most important.

"[60] As to the future of the I and II Corps Zones, he drew a series of phase lines on the map indicating that South Vietnamese forces should hold what they could, but that they could redeploy southward as circumstances dictated.

[citation needed] General Phu then faced the monumental task of moving a corps-sized column of troops, equipment, and vehicles over a largely unknown road some 160 miles (260 km) through the mountains and jungles of the highlands to Nha Trang for the attempted counterattack.

Initially caught by surprise by the South Vietnamese withdrawal, General Dũng ordered his 320th Division to strike the flank of the column while coastal forces raced to halt its forward progress.

"They hit us with everything" said Ranger Private Nguyen Van Sau, describing an unrelenting shower of artillery shells, mortar rounds and rockets that flew from the jungle into the stream of refugees.

At least "75 percent of II Corps combat strength, including the 23rd Infantry Division, as well as Ranger, armor, artillery, engineer and signal units were tragically expended within ten days.

Dũng and his staff had basically adapted Tra's original plan and prepared a three-pronged attack that would be led by the 4th Corps, which would seize the vital highway intersection at Xuân Lộc, the capital of Long Khánh Province and "the gateway to Saigon."

[citation needed] Even after the loss of Da Nang, "the worst single disaster in the history of South Vietnam", the Ford administration continued to disbelieve that the Saigon regime was failing.

[107] A repeat of the Massacre at Huế, albeit on a much larger scale, was promoted by the government as a propaganda ploy since the beginning of the offensive in an effort to unify the population, but it provoked only an overreaction and caused almost complete paralysis when the time came to defend the city.

[118] At 10:51 on 29 April Operation Frequent Wind, the U.S. helicopter evacuation of military and embassy personnel, U.S. civilians, and South Vietnamese citizens thought to be at risk of communist reprisal, was implemented as the city descended into pandemonium.

[citation needed] The other ARVN general in the Mekong Delta, Major Nguyễn Khoa Nam, also committed suicide after the surrender, in the early morning of 1 May 1975 at his IV Corps headquarters in Can Tho.

[130] The first argument is that the Paris Peace Accords that ended the direct American participation in the war was seriously flawed, because it permitted the North Vietnamese to maintain their forces within territorial South Vietnam after the signing of the agreement, thereby dooming the ceasefire.

The result was that North Vietnamese commanders achieved the ultimate goal of military leadership, the quick application of massive force leading to the defeat of the enemy at little cost in manpower.