1st Congress of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine

It was a constituent congress which led to creation of the political party by way of uniting existing Russian Bolsheviks in Ukraine and left faction of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats.

Couple of weeks after signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, on 19 March 1918 in Yekaterinoslav (Dnipro) had convened the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets where the congress discussed and approved the treaty and also announced that Ukraine only formally loosening its federative ties with the Soviet Russia and workers of Ukraine will carry on a fight against the restored bourgeoisie regime.

[4] A cordial greeting about the declaration of independence of the "Ukrainian Federative Soviet Republic" was published in the Russian newspaper Pravda on 22 March 1918.

[4] At that time, before 1918, in Ukraine existed two separate regional associations of the RSDLP(b): Donets-Krivoi Rog basin (Yekaterinoslav) and Southwestern Krai (Kiev).

Another point of view, which reflected the centralizing tendencies of a part of the party workers of Yekaterinoslav region and Donbas, was advocated by Emanuel Kwiring.

To prepare and convene a congress of Bolshevik organizations of Ukraine the Taganrog meeting elected the Organizational Bureau in the composition of Nikolay Skripnik (secretary), Andrei Bubnov, Yan Gamarnik, Vladimir Zatonsky, Stanisław Kosior, Isaak Kreisberg, Georgy Pyatakov.

In addition, the formation of a separate Communist Party of Ukraine objectively destroyed not only the tactical tasks, but also the strategic goals of the RCP(b).

At the beginning of the work, the congress was warmly welcomed by representatives of the Social Democracy of Poland and Lithuania, German, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Romanian, South Slavic and Bessarabian communist groups under the Central Committee of the RCP(b), as well as the head of the Federation of Foreign Groups under Central Committee of the RCP(b) Bela Kun.

B. Gamarnik , S. V. Kosior, Y. M. Kotsyubynskyi, I. M. Kreisberg, and others) overestimated them, downplayed the importance of the strengthening of Soviet power in Russia for the victory of the revolution in Ukraine, and tried to impose a line on a premature general armed uprising.

The congress condemned the positions of supporters of both right-wing and "left-wing" views and defined the tactical line of the CP(b)U, emphasizing that the decisive factor in the victory of the revolutionary forces of Ukraine is the strengthening of the Soviet Russia.

However, E. Kwiring and his supporters, even after the resolution proposed by them was adopted by the congress, continued the struggle directed against the integrity of the Communist Party of Ukraine itself.

At first glance, this amendment was allegedly unprincipled, but, as N. Skripnik pointed out, it allowed an ambiguous interpretation, because regional committees of the Communist Party of Ukraine "will exist on general grounds with Latvian, Polish, etc., and not with the Urals and others included in the RCP(b)".

That is, in case of approval of Kwiring's amendment, the Communist Party of Ukraine practically retained the right to influence its regional committees.