In response to the incident, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and USAF conducted an investigation, the results of which were released on 19 October 2007.

The investigation concluded that nuclear weapons handling standards and procedures had not been followed by numerous USAF personnel involved in the incident.

Although originally designed to equip the B-1B Lancer bomber, the AGM-129 was redesignated so that it would only be carried by the B-52H, mounted on external pylons on the wings or internally in the bomb bay.

[7] To do so, the USAF began to transport its AGM-129s stored at Minot to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana by B-52s for ultimate disposal.

[8] Between 08:00 and 09:00 (local time) on 29 August 2007, a group of USAF airmen, called the breakout crew, entered one of the weapons storage bunkers at Minot to prepare AGM-129 missiles for transport to Barksdale.

A later investigation found that the reason for the error was that the electronic production system for tracking the missiles "had been subverted in favor of an informal process that did not identify the pylon as prepared for the flight.

[10] On the morning of 30 August one of the transport aircraft's flight officers, a Barksdale-assigned B-52 instructor radar navigator, closely inspected the six missiles on the right wing only, which were all properly loaded with training warheads.

The B-52 command pilot did not do a final verification check before signing the manifest listing the cargo as a dozen unarmed AGM-129 missiles to depart Minot.

[13] The incident was the first of its kind in forty years in the United States and was later described by the media as "one of the worst breaches in U.S. nuclear weapons security in decades".

In addition, the DoD announced that a Pentagon-appointed scientific advisory panel, called the Defense Science Board, would study the mishap as part of a larger review of procedures for handling nuclear weapons.

[19] Retired USAF Chief of Staff General Larry Welch was asked by Gates, who had reportedly raised concerns with USAF officials that the original investigation may have unfairly limited blame to midlevel officers, to lead the Defense Science Board advisory panel that would study the mishap as part of a larger review of procedures and policies for handling nuclear weapons.

[21] On 24 October 2007, Secretary of the Air Force Wynne told the House Armed Services Committee that he believed that the 5th Bomb Wing could be recertified and could resume ferrying the AGM-129 cruise missiles to Barksdale for retirement.

During the hearing, Welch stated that "the military units responsible for handling the bombs are not properly inspected and, as a result, may not be ready to perform their missions."

He added, "If you look at all the areas and all the ways that we have to store and handle these weapons in order to perform the mission, it just requires, we believe, more resources and more attention than they're getting.

"[30] Minot's full NSI took place beginning on 17 May 2008, and was conducted by inspectors from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the USAF's Air Combat Command (ACC).

Following the inspection, Westa stated, "Overall, their assessment painted a picture of some things we need to work on in the areas of training and discipline".

[32] On 5 June 2008, Robert Gates announced the results of an investigation into the incorrect shipment in 2006 of four Mk 12 forward-section reentry vehicle assemblies to Taiwan.

Naval Nuclear Propulsion, found that the Taiwan missile incident was, in Gates' words, "a degradation of the authority, standards of excellence and technical competence within the nation's ICBM force.

"[34] As a result of the investigation, Gates announced that "a substantial number of Air Force general officers and colonels have been identified as potentially subject to disciplinary measures, ranging from removal from command to letters of reprimand," and that he had accepted the resignations of Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne and USAF Chief of Staff T. Michael Moseley.

Gates added that he had asked James R. Schlesinger to lead a senior-level task force to recommend improvements in the stewardship and operation of nuclear weapons, delivery vehicles and sensitive components by the Department of Defense.

[34] On 13 September 2008, Gates announced Schlesinger's task force's recommendations by calling on the USAF to place all nuclear weapons under a single command.

Gates announced that acting Air Force Secretary Michael B. Donley and Chief of Staff General Norton A. Schwartz were "reviewing the recommendations" for disciplinary action against USAF officers previously involved in the nuclear mission.

[39] Carpenter stated that Westa was relieved for his "inability to foster a culture of excellence, a lack of focus on the strategic mission, and substandard performance during several nuclear surety inspections, including the newly activated 69th Bomb Squadron.

[41] The panel stated that it found "a distressing degree of inattention to the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence among many senior DoD military and civilian leaders.

"[42] On 24 October 2008, new USAF Secretary Michael Donley announced the creation of Air Force Global Strike Command, which became operational on 7 August 2009.