[1][2] In April 2021, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) attributed the accident to "'the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, along with the absence of alerts from both airplanes' traffic display systems."

It was manufactured in 1951, was equipped with Edo floats, and had 16,452 total flight hours at the time of its most recent annual inspection in on April 16, 2019.

[2] The DHC-2 broke up in mid-air, creating an approximately 2,000-by-1,000-foot (610 by 300 m) debris field about 1.75 miles (2.82 km) southwest of the DHC-3 crash site.

The DHC-2 fuselage, empennage, and cabin structure were separated from one another, and the right wing showed damage consistent with propeller impacts.

[1][2] The DHC-3 pitched about 27 degrees nose down, but the pilot was able to maintain partial control and perform a landing flare before touching down in George Inlet.

[2][7] The pilot suffered head injuries in the collision and landing but was able to open the right rear door and help passengers exit.

Two propeller blades were partially broken off, while all three were bent and gouged in a manner consistent with heavy rotational contact with a solid object, and were smeared with white paint.

[2] The body of the fatal front-seat passenger in the DHC-3 was found underwater, still strapped into her seat in the aircraft wreckage; her primary cause of death was determined to have been blunt force trauma with drowning being a contributing factor.

[9][10] Amid increased oversight by the FAA, Taquan resumed limited cargo service on May 23,[11] scheduled passenger flights on May 31, and on-demand sightseeing tours on June 3.

[13] In a meeting held on April 20, 2021, the NTSB attributed the accident to "'the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept along with the absence of alerts from both airplanes' traffic display systems."

However, an FAA-provided equipment upgrade to the Garmin GSL 71 system in the DHC-3, implemented due to the phaseout of the FAA Capstone Program, had disabled the auditory traffic alert feature.

Furthermore, the pressure altitude broadcasting feature of the GSL 71 was disabled because the control knob was set to the OFF position, and the Taquan Air preflight checklist (which listed the name of a different operator) did not require the pilot to set the knob to the appropriate position to broadcast pressure altitude.

Additionally, the NTSB recommended that ForeFlight upgrade their software such that automatic alerts are provided by default when the target aircraft is not broadcasting pressure altitude.