On February 23, 2019, the Boeing 767-375ER(BCF) operating this flight crashed into Trinity Bay during approach into Houston, killing the two crew members and a single passenger on board.

At 12:36, Aska transferred control of the aircraft to Blakely, telling him that the electronic flight instrument (EFI) switch on his side had malfunctioned.

The pilot of another nearby airliner reported IMC, and a video taken by a ground witness showed a shelf cloud passing over the area at the time.

The controller accepted but also advised the crew to expedite their descent to 3,000 feet (910 m) and said, "I'm gunna get ya west of this weather and northbound for a base leg."

Witnesses to the crash described the plane as entering a nosedive; some also recalled hearing "what sounded like lightning" before the Boeing 767 collided with the ground.

[19] The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an alert after radar and radio contact was lost around 30 miles (50 km) southeast of its destination.

The crash site was mostly mud marsh, with water varying in depth from zero to five feet (1.5 m) deep, thus airboats were needed to access the area.

"[10][37] On December 19, 2019, the NTSB released a public docket containing over 3,000 pages of factual information it had collected during the investigation, with a final report to follow at an unspecified later date.

"[38] On June 11, 2020, the NTSB announced that the next board meeting would determine the cause of the accident;[39] the NTSB determined during a public board meeting held on July 14, that the flight crashed because of the first officer's inappropriate response to an inadvertent activation of the airplane's go-around mode, resulting in his spatial disorientation that led him to place the airplane in a steep descent from which the crew did not recover.

[41] On August 6, 2020, the NTSB posted the final accident report to their website, which stated: The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inappropriate response by the first officer as the pilot flying to an inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, which led to his spatial disorientation and nose-down control inputs that placed the airplane in a steep descent from which the crew did not recover.

Also contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to implement the pilot records database in a sufficiently robust and timely manner.

[11]The NTSB found that the descent had proceeded normally until the go-around mode was actuated and the aircraft's autopilot and autothrottle increased engine thrust and nose-up pitch as designed.

[11]: 2  The NTSB concluded that the first officer most likely struck the go-around switch accidentally with his left wrist or his wristwatch while manipulating the nearby speedbrake lever and that neither pilot realized that the aircraft's automated flight mode had been changed.

[11]: ix, 40–41  Investigators concluded that the pilots were unable to see the ground until the aircraft exited the clouds approximately 3,000 feet (910 m) above the bay, at which point safe recovery from the steep descent would have been impossible.

[11][15] Despite Blakely's improvements, Atlas Air placed him in the pilot proficiency watch program (PWP) due to his training issues.

[43] Aska's first issues at Atlas emerged in July 2017, the same month he joined the airline, when he was declined an oral exam for his type rating on the 767 as he needed remediation training.

Aska then went through five fixed-base (non-moving) flight simulator sessions, experiencing difficulties with normal procedures, and underwent more remediation training.

[11]: 6  Aska underwent remedial training on September 25 and the next day, he reattempted his checkride successfully, receiving his type rating on the aircraft.

A 2010 amendment to the Pilot Record Improvement Act (PRIA) passed after the 2009 crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407 required the FAA to record training failures in the database; however, this provision had not been fully implemented due to privacy concerns and industry opposition, particularly from business aviation operators who objected to the program's stringent record-keeping requirements.

Atlas Air was also criticized for its reliance on agents rather than flight operations specialists to check the training backgrounds of pilots it hired.