2020s European re-armament
This represented a marked decrease from historical Cold War spending levels, when European NATO members typically allocated between 3% and 5% of their national GDP to defense expenditures.
Additional concerns arose regarding potential U.S. positions on conflicts affecting European security, particularly regarding Russia and Ukraine amid the former's invasion of Ukrainian territory.
"[7] The strategy established several ambitious targets for 2030, including requirements for EU member states to allocate 50% of their procurement budgets to purchases from Europe's industrial defense sector.
[8] In February 2025, NATO initiated discussions to substantially increase its defense spending targets for member nations above the previous 2% GDP benchmark established a decade earlier.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced during the 61st Munich Security Conference that alliance members would need to increase their military spending to "considerably more than 3 percent" of national GDP.
[9] Eastern European nations, particularly the Baltic states and Poland, demonstrated willingness to approach higher spending levels to address potential threats from Russia.
However, Northern European countries with fiscally conservative governments such as the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden expressed opposition to new debt issuance during treasury discussions.
The Danish government emphasized rapid procurement of military equipment, with Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen warning that Russia could threaten NATO countries within two years without appropriate counter-measures.
[12] In February 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron characterized Russia as an "existential threat" to Europe, convening a special meeting in Paris to coordinate European responses under the Weimar+ framework.
Within the governing traffic light coalition, the Green Party expressed concerns about ensuring eventual scalability reduction when security conditions improved.
[15] In March 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz emphasized the need for sustained arms manufacturing capacity rather than depending on military procurement through purchasing transactions.
In Troisdorf, North Rhine-Westphalia, citizens and local politicians protested against Diehl Defence's planned ammunition factory, citing concerns about required security zones and land use conflicts.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine's close proximity to the Baltic States led to the country increasing its defense spending to 2.8% of national GDP in 2024, while simultaneously developing new domestic production and maintenance capabilities to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities.
[19] In June 2024, Lithuania signed a landmark $200 million investment agreement with German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall to establish an ammunition production facility.
[19] Dutch Finance Minister Eelco Heinen advocated for compensating increased defense spending through budget cuts in other areas besides through additional common debt issuance.
Tusk also diverted from French President Emmanuel Macron's desire to send national troops into Ukraine for combat, instead recommending logistical support.
Due to Europe's prior deindustrialization especially in military sectors, defense contractors struggled with capacity constraints amid increased demand for arming Ukraine.
While some leaders, including NATO Secretary-General Rutte, advocated for redirecting a portion of social spending toward defense, this proposition met resistance from many European governments.
[25] Geopolitical author and journalist George Monbiot believed that potential changes to U.S. foreign policy away from Europe and NATO should prompt the United Kingdom nations to reconsider their defense postures towards independent militarization and nuclear armament.
