[2]: 18  Five out of its nine infantry battalions and its armored cavalry squadron were all units with long combat records, having fought People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in the DMZ area for several years.

[2]: 165  In contrast to this assessment, other authors assert that the 56th and 57th Regiments were made up of recaptured deserters, released criminals, poorly-trained transferees from the Regional and Popular Forces and fresh draftees, led by officers and NCOs rejected by other units.

The newly activated 56th and 57th Regiments were deployed over a series of strongpoints and fire support bases dotting the area immediately south of the DMZ and from the coast to the mountains in the west.

Camp Carroll was the lynchpin of the ARVN northern and western defense line situated on Route 9, the main road west to the Laos border.

[3]: 130 The offensive began at noon on 30 March 1972, when an intense artillery barrage rained down on the northernmost ARVN outposts as the 56th and 57th Regiments were still in the process of occupying Camp Carroll and Strongpoint C-1.

From the west, the 312th, including an armored regiment, moved out of Laos along Route 9, past Khe Sanh, and into the Quảng Trị River valley towards Camp Carroll.

[4]: 43  Early on the morning of 1 April under pressure from the PAVN the 4th Vietnamese Marine Corps Battalion abandoned Firebase Sarge and retreated to Mai Loc Camp.

[2]: 27 By 11:00 on 2 April the ARVN 20th Tank Battalion moved forward to Đông Hà to support the 258th Marine Brigade in and around the town and defend the crucial road and rail bridges across the Cua Viet River.

[4]: 50–2  Marine ANGLICO units called in naval gunfire to hit PAVN forces near the bridges on the north bank of the river and destroyed four PT-76 amphibious tanks east of Đông Hà.

[2]: 30  The capture of Camp Carroll and Mai Loc allowed PAVN forces to cross the Cam Lộ bridge, 11 km to the west of Đông Hà.

[4]: 65  On 7 April the Marines withdrew from Đông Hà leaving the defense to the 57th Regiment, the 1st ARVN Armored Brigade, 20th Tank Battalion and the 4th and 5th Ranger Groups.

[4]: 70 On 18 April the PAVN 308th Division attacking from the southwest attempted to outflank Đông Hà but were repulsed by a tenacious defense and intense US airstrikes.

[2]: 74 Trưởng writing in 1980 rejected much of the criticism of the Division's performance during the Easter Offensive and in particular that it consisted mostly of deserters, pardoned military criminals and other undesirable elements cast off by other units.

Trưởng largely blamed the Corps' commander Lãm and his staff for failing to provide adequate guidance and support to the Division.

On 16 January the Division commander Major General Hinh, committed the 51st Regiment to continue the attack to seize the former Firebase West on Hill 1460 (15°35′06″N 108°11′35″E / 15.585°N 108.193°E / 15.585; 108.193) guarding the eastern approach to Hiệp Đức District.

Meanwhile, elements of the 2nd Regiment were across the Quế Sơn Valley and had seized the hill above Chau Son, thus controlling Route 534 into Hiệp Đức.

[6]: 374  On 26 January, with the ceasefire imminent and VC forces moving into the populated lowlands of Quảng Nam, the Division had to terminate its attack.

Second, PAVN command, staff, logistics, and communications had been thoroughly expanded and proven during this campaign; the new 3rd Corps had the valuable experience of a major offensive behind it.

Third, the PAVN had pushed its holdings to the edge of the narrow coastal plain and was within artillery range of nearly every major South Vietnamese installation and population center.

[7]: 124 In late January, the Division conducted a successful six-day foray into contested ground in Duy Xuyen and Quế Sơn Districts of Quang Nam, again causing high casualties.

[7]: 139 From 8 March artillery-supported infantry assaults were launched against the Division, 3rd Airborne Brigade and Regional and Popular Force positions from Đại Lộc to Quế Sơn.

[7]: 157 On 16 March the PAVN pounded Thăng Bình District Town with artillery and overran outposts southwest of the village, but by 20 March two battalions of the Division, sent from Quang Nam Province, joined two RF battalions in a counterattack causing high PAVN casualties in tough fighting east of Thăng Bình.

[7]: 159 By nightfall on 23 March the official count of refugees in Da Nang, based upon police registrations, was 121,000, but the unofficial estimate by the U.S. Consul General was 400,000.

PAVN attacks in Quang Nam Province were largely blunted by the Division and Regional and Popular Forces; security, although relative, was better in Da Nang than anywhere else in I Corps.

Early that morning, 14 PAVN heavy rockets struck a refugee camp on the edge of Da Nang Air Base killing and wounding many civilians, mostly women and children.