Napoleon I's second abdication

Following the defeat at Waterloo, the French people's initial fascination with Napoleon, which had been prevalent since his return from exile, quickly faded as several Coalition armies advanced into France, reaching the gates of Paris.

Although his commanders urged him to remain and continue leading the troops in the field, Napoleon reasoned that if he did so, the home front might surrender to the Coalition forces, thereby undermining any progress he had achieved on the battlefield.

If he had keenly felt its influence prior to his defeat in battle, the task of calming its fervor and securing its support for renewed sacrifices must have seemed daunting, if not hopeless, when he suddenly arrived in Paris on June 21, just one week after assuming command of his army, to announce the disastrous outcome of his campaign.

[2] The imperialists in the capital, who had harbored extravagant hopes following news of the victory at Ligny, barely had time to express their elation before ominous rumors of sudden reversals in Napoleon's cause began to circulate.

[5] The ministers were too well acquainted with the general views and disposition of the Chamber of Representatives to pronounce a direct approval of this step; but Napoleon, perceiving their hesitation, called upon them to express their opinion upon the measures of public safety required by existing circumstances.

Lazare, Count of Carnot, the Minister of the Interior, conceived it to lie essential that the country should be declared in danger; that the Fédérés and National Guards should be called to arms; that Paris should be placed in a stage of siege, and measures adopted for its defence; that at the last extremity the armed force should retire behind the Loire, and take up an entrenched position; that the Army of La Vendee, where the Civil War had nearly terminated, as also the Corps of Observation in the south, should be recalled: and the enemy checked until sufficient force could be united and organised for the assumption of a vigorous offensive, by which he should be driven out of France.

He knew also that the great parties in the Chambers, with the exception of the imperialists, who were in the minority but whom he secretly flattered with the prospect of a Napoleon II, were fully prepared to depose the Emperor, in favour of full constitutional freedom and liberal institutions.

The resolute attitude assumed by the allies soon satisfied him that, although the Emperor might once more dazzle the world with some brilliant feat of arms, he must eventually succumb to the fixed determination of the other sovereign powers to crush his usurped authority; and to the overwhelming masses with which Europe was preparing to subjugate the country.

[7] When, therefore, Napoleon's enterprise had so signally failed, and the re-occupation of Paris appeared to be its necessary consequence: Fouché foresaw clearly, that were the proposed dictatorship to be assumed by means of a sudden and forced dissolution of the Chambers, implying that the recent reverses had been produced by treachery on the part of the Representatives; and were new levies to be raised en masse, in support of the force that yet remained available; the result would inevitably be anarchy and confusion in the capital, disorder and excesses throughout the whole country, renewed disasters to the nation, together with an awful and useless sacrifice of life.

[9] The Cabinet Council continued in discussion; some supporting, and others disapproving, the propositions of Napoleon: who, at length, yielding to the arguments of Fouché and Carnot, declared he would submit himself to the loyalty of the Chambers, and confer with them as to the measures which the critical position of the country might render necessary.

Marquis de Lafayette, the acknowledged Leader of the Liberal Party, having received intelligence of the subject of discussion in the Council, and aware that not a moment was to be lost in averting the blow with which their liberties were menaced, ascended the tribune, and addressed the Chamber, amidst the most profound silence, and breathless suspense:[9] Representatives!

The leading members were now elsewhere with Napoleon Bonaparte, and the others had not the courage to face the impending storm[11]—and, after a brief discussion, in which their instant adoption was urged in the strongest manner, they were carried by acclamation, with the exception of the Fourth, which was suspended on account of the invidious distinction which it appeared to convey between the troops of the Line and the National Guards.

To him, who had so long exercised an almost unlimited control in the State, who had led mighty Armies to victory, and who had subjected powerful nations to his despotic sway, this sudden and energetic voice of the people, conveyed through the medium of their Representatives, aroused him to a full sense of the wonderful change which had been effected in the public mind, and in his own individual position, through the intervention of a Constitution.

It contained a succinct recital of the disasters experienced at Mont St Jean: and recommended the Representatives to unite with the Head of the State in preserving the country from the fate of Poland, and from the re-imposition of the yoke which it had thrown off.

A stormy discussion ensued, in the course of which it was soon made manifest that the Representatives required a more explicit declaration of Napoleon's opinions and designs: one, in fact, more in accordance with the views which the majority of them evidently entertained, and was apparently determined to enforce.

I would not, therefore, urge the adoption of this measure, had I not reason to believe that you will soon receive a Message in which the Emperor will declare his wish; that the effect of this should first be tried; and that, should he then prove an insuperable obstacle to the nation being permitted to treat for its independence, he will be ready to make whatever sacrifice may be demanded of him.

It was looked upon as an artful design upon the part of Napoleon to create delay by proposing to the Chambers a proceeding which he was well aware would prove unsuccessful; and to seize the first favourable opportunity of destroying their independence, and re-establishing his despotism — to re-enact, in short, the Eighteenth of Brumaire.

[20] At length, one of them, the Representative for Isère, Antoine Duchesne [fr],[21] ascended the tribune, and spoke in the following energetic and decided manner: I do not believe that the project proposed by the Committee is capable of attaining the desired end.

[25] The proposition of Duchesne was instantly supported by General Solignac: an officer who, during the last five years, had been made to suffer the severest mortifications, arising from the hatred entertained towards him by Napoleon, in consequence of his refusal to be the servile instrument of his ambition; and, therefore, the curiosity of the Chamber was naturally excited to hear what course he was about to adopt.

we ought to consider the safety of the Empire, and the maintenance of our liberal institutions; and, while the Government is inclined to present to you such measures as tend to this end, it appears important to preserve to the Chamber the honour of not having proposed an object which ought to be the free concession of the Monarch.

[28] In the meantime, Napoleon had been made acquainted with the disposition of the Chamber of Representatives, by Regnaud de Saint Jean d'Angely, who hastened to warn him that if he did not immediately abdicate, his deposition would, in all probability, be declared.

Defeated and humbled by foreign enemies in the field, subdued and controlled by the Representatives of the Nation; he was forced to descend from a throne whence he had at one time swayed the destinies of sovereigns rendered dependent on his mighty will.

The cessation of the political existence of such a man would have been most naturally looked for as an event coincident only with the termination of a life which, if not closed upon the pinnacle of glory, would be sought for amidst the shock of battle, or in the vortex of a state convulsion.

[32] That he meditated a second Eighteenth of Brumaire, there can be no doubt; but the decided tone of the debates in the National Assembly, the solicitations of his friends, and the hope of securing the throne to his family, induced him to abandon all idea of such a project.

It is, besides, more than probable that, aware as he was of the bad feeling that existed, to a great extent, both in the Chambers and in the country, towards King Louis XVIII; as also of the conflicting principles of the different factions, he calculated upon the chances of an Involution productive of anarchy and confusion, which he yet might be called upon to reduce to order and submission.

[33] When it is considered that the great mass of the Army of the Line was devoted to Napoleon; that the rallied Army of the North was falling back upon Paris, where it would concentrate its strength and be reinforced from Regimental Depots; and, further, that the armies on the Eastern Frontier were still holding their respective positions, and that even in La Vendée the Imperial troops had succeeded in quelling the insurrection, — when, in addition to all this, it is considered how great, how extraordinary, was the influence induced by the prestige of Napoleon with the majority of the nation, dazzled as the latter had been by countless victories that outweighed, in its estimation, those fatal disasters which it ascribed solely to the united power of the great European Coalition established against France, — the contemporary British historian William Siborne considered it is impossible not to be struck by the firm, bold, and determined attitude assumed by the French Parliament, on this critical occasion, that it displayed one of the brightest examples the world had yet beheld of the force of constitutional legislation; and under all the attendant circumstances, it was a remarkable triumph of free institutions over monarchical despotism.

Blücher ignored the request, and Wellington referred the Commissioners to his note of 26 June on the proposed Suspension of Hostilities; and stated that, with regard to the passport for Napoleon, he had no authority from his Government, or from the Allies, to give any answer to such demand.

Blücher, hearing that he was living there in retirement, had despatched Major von Colomb, on 28 June, with the 8th Hussars and two battalions of infantry to secure the bridge at Chatou, lower down the Seine, leading directly to the house.

[49] Napoleon at length yielded to what he considered to be his destiny, and the preparations for travelling having been completed, he entered his carriage at about 17:00 on 29 June, accompanied by Generals Bertrand, Gourgaud, and other devoted friends, and took the road to Rochefort, whither two French frigates had been ordered for the embarkation of himself and his entourage for America.

Also that day, Napoleon Bonaparte embarked, at Rochefort, on board the French frigate Saale, and proceeded, accompanied by Méduse, in which was his small entourage, to an anchorage in the Basque Roads off the Isle of Aix, with the intention of setting sail to America.