Aboriginal title in California
Reports commissioned by the federal government during this period uniformly downplayed the extent of indigenous land rights under Spanish and Mexican rule.
[10] On September 30, 1850, Congress passed an amended version of Fremont's bill appropriating $25,000 and authorizing the President to appoint three commissioners, O. M. Wozencraft, Redick McKee and George W. Barbour, to negotiate treaties with the tribes of California.
[14] Because Fremont and Gwin represented the key swing votes between the Whig and Democratic parties, none of the treaties were ever ratified and all were classified.
[15] Federal agents had already persuaded nearly all of the Indians to remove to their would-be reservations while the treaties were pending; soon, "starvation, disease, and murder, also known as the California genocide, reduced their population to 17,000.
[17] The Commissioners were to issue patents to the claims they found meritorious and the other lands were to pass into the public domain at the end of the two years.
[27] California Attorney General Earl Warren (future Chief Justice) finally argued the case in 1941.
[31] Therefore, in Thompson v. Doaksum (1886), the California Supreme Court considered the application of the Act to Indians as a matter of first impression.
The court upheld a quiet title judgment for the plaintiff, holding: "If defendants [Indians belonging to the Big Meadows tribe] had any right to the land, it should have been asserted in the land department pending the application for patent, or by direct proceeding on the part of the government to set aside the patent.
"[32] Two years later, Byrne v. Alas (1888), the court distinguished its holding by reversing a quiet title judgment against a group of Mission Indians.
[33] There, the Mission Indians did not claim fee simple by any Mexican grant, but rather "by virtue of their possession, and the continuous, open, and exclusive use and occupancy by their predecessors and ancestors ever since the year 1815.
"[35] In Barker v. Harvey (1901), the Supreme Court heard the consolidated appeals of a group of Mission Indians who had lost a quiet title action by several non-Indians.
[38] First, the Court reaffirmed its holding from Botiller v. Dominguez (1889) that even perfect title was subject to the requirements of the Land Claims Act.
[39] Barker rejected in part the reasoning of the California Supreme Court from Byrne, noting: "Surely a claimant would have little reason for presenting to the land commission his claim to land, and securing a confirmation of that claim, if the only result was to transfer the naked fee to him, burdened by an Indian right of permanent occupancy.
"[40] Thus, Barker has since been cited by the Court as the source of the rule that the Land Claims Act itself extinguished aboriginal title.
[43] From this, the Court concluded that the aboriginal title had long been extinguished by abandonment: It thus appears that prior to the cession the Mexican authorities, upon examination, found that the Indians had abandoned the land; that the only adverse claim was vested in the mission of San Diego and made an absolute grant, subject only to the condition of satisfying whatever claims the mission might have.
[52] The Karuk attempt to re-assert their claims decades later based upon the federal government's general trust relationship and other statutes were unsuccessful.
[53] Since Super, the Court has twice interpreted the Land Claims Act to also have imposed the requirement to file upon the state of California itself.
Chunie v. Ringrose (1986), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the trespass and conversion claims of Chumash tribe (joined by the federal government) over the ownership of the Channel Islands of California (and the channel beds surrounding the Santa Cruz and Santa Rosa islands) in California.
[55] First, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the District Court's holding that Mexican land grants had extinguished the Chumash's title.
[56] Next, the Ninth Circuit rejected the tribe's arguments that the islands were not within the land ceded by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
[61] Thus, "[g]iven the line of Supreme Court decisions recognizing the extensive reach of the Act of 1851," the Ninth Circuit stated that Cramer could only avail those whose individual aboriginal title post-dated 1851.
[64] Cramer v. United States (1923) involved would-be Indian reservations (as provided for in the aforementioned unratified treaties) that had subsequently been granted to railroads by the federal government.
[70] Fourth, the Court rejected the statute limiting the time in which the government could challenge the validity of its land patents, holding that did not apply to suits on behalf of Indians.
We therefore conclude that any individual occupancy rights acquired by the Danns must have had their inception prior to November 26, 1934, the date that the lands in question were withdrawn from entry by Executive Order No.
