[3][4] The clear and present danger standard, used in this ruling to uphold the criminal convictions, fell out of favor and was largely overturned by the Supreme Court in 1969.

[7] The defendants were charged under the Sedition Act of 1918 for inciting resistance to American military actions and urging curtailment of production of essential war materiel.

Justice John Hessin Clarke, author of the majority opinion, argued that Congress had passed the Sedition Act with the rationale that critics of American military efforts presented an "imminent danger that it [the offending speech] will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.

"[2] The Supreme Court upheld the defendants' criminal convictions per the clear and present danger test that it had formulated earlier the same year in Schenck v. United States, a case that also involved a speech-related arrest under the Sedition Act.

[8] Clarke argued that the defendants' leaflets in Abrams demonstrated an intent to hinder production of war materiel, which was a clear violation of the terms of the Sedition Act and could not be characterized as simple expressions of political opinion.

Clarke concluded: This is not an attempt to bring about a change of administration by candid discussion, for no matter what may have incited the outbreak on the part of the defendant anarchists, the manifest purpose of such a publication was to create an attempt to defeat the war plans of the government of the United States, by bringing upon the country the paralysis of a general strike, thereby arresting the production of all munitions and other things essential to the conduct of the war.

"[2] During the hearing, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes objected on the grounds that the criminal prosecutors should have shown specific intent by the defendants to bring about the harms for which they were charged, but the majority dismissed this argument.

[2] Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes had sided with the majority in the earlier cases, notably Schenck, in which the Supreme Court upheld speech-related criminal convictions under the Sedition Act.

In Abrams, Holmes issued a dissenting opinion that reflected a change in his views on criticism of government and the intent to create harms to the public or the nation.

[2] Holmes's previous opinion in Schenck had been criticized by Constitutional scholar Zechariah Chafee for failing to distinguish between speech-based opposition to military operations and intent to commit a crime.

[3][4] Holmes also had experience as a judge in criminal court and was familiar with the common law of convictions and sentencing, which is believed to have informed his changing views on the prosecution of speech-based offenses.

[2]While the criminal convictions against Jacob Abrams and the other defendants were upheld by the Supreme Court, the dissent by Holmes has proven to be more influential for later First Amendment jurisprudence.