During the 1820s, Aceh became a regional political and commercial power, supplying half of the world's pepper, which increased the revenues and influence of local feudal rajas.

[9] Following the 1869 opening of the Suez Canal and changing shipping routes, the British and Dutch signed the 1871 Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Sumatra which ended British territorial claims to Sumatra, allowing the Dutch a free hand within their sphere of influence in Maritime Southeast Asia while handing them the responsibility to check piracy.

[7] Dutch territorial ambitions in Aceh were fuelled by a desire to exploit its natural resources, especially black pepper and oil, and to eliminate an independent native state player.

[10] The Dutch tried several strategies over the course of the war; single rapid attacks in 1873 failed, which then led them to pursue a naval blockade, reconciliation efforts, concentration within a line of forts, and finally passive containment.

[1] An expedition under Major General Johan Harmen Rudolf Köhler was sent out on 26 March 1873, which bombarded the capital Banda Aceh and was able to occupy most of the coastal areas by April.

[7] Underestimating the military abilities of the Acehnese, the Dutch made some tactical errors and sustained losses including the deaths of Köhler and 80 troops.

[12][13] In an attempt to preserve Aceh's independence, Sultan Mahmud appealed to the other Western powers and the Ottoman Empire for direct help but to little avail.

[4] By January 1874, deteriorating conditions forced Sultan Mahmud Syah and his followers to abandon Banda Aceh and retreat to the interior.

[4] Around 1880 the Dutch strategy changed, and rather than continuing the war, they now concentrated on defending areas they already controlled, which were mostly limited to the capital city (modern Banda Aceh),[3] and the harbour town of Ulee Lheue.

In an attempt to win the support of the local Acehnese, the Dutch rebuilt the Masjid Raya Baiturrahman or Great Mosque in Banda Aceh as a gesture of reconciliation.

From the mid-1880s, the Acehnese military leadership was dominated by religious ulema, including Teungku Chik di Tiro (Muhamma Saman), who propagated the concept of a "holy war" through sermons and texts known as hikayat or poetic tales.

Hurgronje managed to get the confidence of many Aceh leaders and gathered valuable intelligence for the Dutch government on the activities of Indonesian Hajj pilgrims.

In Hurgronje's analysis of Acehnese society, he minimised the role of the Sultan and argued that attention should be paid to the hereditary chiefs and nobles, the Ulee Balang, who he felt could be trusted as local administrators.

As part of a policy of divide-and-conquer, Hurgronje urged the Dutch leadership to widen the existing gulf between the Acehnese nobility and the religious leaders.

[2] Hurgronje was a friend of the Arab Grand Mufti of Batavia, Habib Usman bin Yahya, who issued a fatwa to support the Dutch war against Aceh.

In 1894, the penghulu or judge Hasan Mustafa also helped bring a stop to the fighting by issuing a fatwa, telling the Muslims to submit to the Dutch colonial government.

[18] In 1903, the main secular Acehnese resistance leaders including Sultan Alauddin Muhammad Da'ud Syah II, Tuanku Raja Keumala, Mahmud and Muda Perkasa capitulated.

The Dutch consolidated their control over Aceh by practising a policy of religious tolerance as a means of dissuading the Acehnese from taking up an armed struggle.

The Dutch establishment defended its actions in Aceh by citing a moral imperative to liberate the masses from the oppression and backward practices of independent native rulers that did not meet accepted international norms.

[20] Colonial influence in the remote highland areas of Aceh was never substantial, however, and limited guerrilla resistance led by religious ulema persisted until 1942.

[47][48][49][50] During the revolt, the Japanese troops armed with mortars and machine guns were charged by sword wielding Acehnese under Teungku Abduldjalil (Tengku Abdul Djalil) in Buloh Gampong Teungah and Tjot Plieng on 10 and 13 November.

Throughout the early 20th century, Dutch citizens and personnel were targeted by sporadic suicide attacks by the Acehnese who were influenced by the Hikayat Perang Sabil and other proscribed texts.

[60] Acehnese resentment was further stoked by a system of forced corvee labour where subjects were required to work on government roadwork projects for 24 days a year.

[48][49][50][64] During the revolt, the Japanese troops armed with mortars and machine guns were charged by sword wielding Acehnese under Teungku Abduldjalil (Tengku Abdul Djalil) in Buloh Gampong Teungah and Tjot Plieng on 10 and 13 November.

[67] During the Indonesian National Revolution following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the aristocracy were targeted for retribution due to their collaboration with the Dutch and the region became a stronghold for Sukarno's Republicans.

[61] Following the Dutch transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in August 1949, many Acehnese became dissatisfied with the policies of the Javanese-dominated central government in Jakarta and began agitating for autonomy.

[68] Grievances included Aceh's incorporation into the predominantly Christian Batak province of North Sumatra, its poor financial and political rewards within the unitary Indonesian Republic and the failure to implement sharia law.

[71] These factors led to a short-lived rebellion by the Darul Islam movement under Daud Bereueh[61] which was suppressed by the Indonesian armed forces.