One school, which had Secretary of War Henry Stimson as its chief proponent, believed that the apparent secrets of the atomic bomb were scientific in nature, and could not be monopolised forever.
[4] The other school included men like Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who felt that the US monopoly on atomic weapons had been honestly earned and should not be surrendered.
A letter of transmittal at the beginning of the Report embodies the comments that Acheson's Committee made on the unanimous findings and recommendations of the Board of Consultants.
In response, the Acheson–Lilienthal Report proposed that the complete path from the uranium and thorium mines to post production be under international ownership.
Although Truman accepted the report in general, his appointment of financier Bernard Baruch to carry the proposal forward in the United Nations led to demands for punishment for violations and that those penalties could not be vetoed by the United Nations Security Council, as well as unrestricted inspections within the Soviet Union but still insisting that the Soviets should agree not to develop the bomb.
That, combined with US continued insistence on retaining the bomb until it was satisfied with the effectiveness of international control, ultimately led to the plan's rejection by the Soviets to the surprise of no one.
[4] The consultants heading the project comprised Chester Barnard, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Charles A. Thomas, Harry A. Winne, and David E. Lilienthal, while the official authors, who had worked on the Manhattan Project and included some of the United States' top scientists, comprised Luis Walter Alvarez, Robert F. Bacher, Manson Benedict, Hans Bethe, Arthur Compton, Farrington Daniels, J. Robert Oppenheimer, John R. Ruhoff, G. T. Seaborg, Frank Spedding, Charles A. Thomas, and Walter Zinn.