The day after launching an invasion of Zululand, the British Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford led a reconnaissance in force against the kraal of Zulu Chief Sihayo kaXongo.

This was intended to secure his left flank for an advance on the Zulu capital at Ulundi and as retribution against Sihayo for the incursion of his sons into the neighbouring British Colony of Natal.

A frontal assault was launched by auxiliary troops from the Natal Native Contingent (NNC), supported by British regulars, while a mixed unit of mounted infantry moved onto the high ground to the rear of the Zulus.

The action is believed to have led Cetshwayo to attack Chelmsford's force in preference to the two other British columns operating in Zululand.

In 1877 Sir Henry Bartle Frere was dispatched as High Commissioner for Southern Africa with a mandate to bring the existing colonies, indigenous African groups and the Boer republics under British authority.

[8] Frere viewed the independent Zulu Kingdom as a possible threat to this plan and sought an excuse to declare war and annex it.

He established a boundary commission to look into a dispute between Zululand and the Boer Transvaal, which had been recently annexed by the British, hoping for an outcome that would enrage the Zulu king, Cetshwayo.

Frere mobilised British troops on the border and requested a meeting with Cetshwayo's representatives in December, ostensibly to discuss the report of the boundary commission.

[9] The main force, the Centre Column under Chelmsford, crossed the Buffalo River into Zulu territory at Rorke's Drift and made camp on the far side.

[15] On 6 January Chelmsford had written to Frere that he had received reports that Sihayo had assembled 8,000 men to attack the British when they made their crossing, but it was unopposed.

Glyn was in formal command but Chelmsford was prone to interfere in tactical matters and helped direct the movement of the column.

[4][7] This practice led to uncertainty over the division of responsibility in the column, not helped by a personal rift between Glyn's chief of staff Major Francis Clery and Chelmsford's, Lieutenant-Colonel John North Crealock.

[25] Chelmsford ordered Russell's mounted infantry to move to the south where the slope was climbable and to sweep around behind the Zulus on the heights to threaten them and cut off any retreat.

The NNC were in good spirits until they came within gunshot of the "several score" Zulu warriors who were hiding among boulders, shrubs and caves at the edges of the gorge.

[29] The path was barricaded and covered by concealed marksmen and, seeing the NNC falter, Black and a staff officer, Captain Henry Harford moved forward to support Hamilton-Browne.

On the way Harford spotted a Zulu taking aim at Glyn, who was observing from open ground, and shouted a warning, preventing his injury or death.

[4] Harford rallied a group of NNC men and made some forward progress, clearing caves in the cliff face.

[4] Black's hat was shot out of his hand and he was struck "below the belt" by a boulder thrown from the cliffs, causing pain but no injury and halting his advance.

[33] After the action a force of four companies of the 2/24th and part of the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd NNC, under the overall command of Colonel Henry Degacher of the 24th Regiment was sent to Sihayo's kraal with orders to raze it.

[41] The prisoners were interrogated with physical violence but did not reveal the presence of the Zulu field army, 25,000 warriors and 10,000 followers and reserves, which was then at a position just over 30 kilometres (20 mi) from the Centre Column.

[33] Chelmsford wrote to Frere: I am in great hope that the news of the storming of Sihayo's stronghold and the capture of so many of his cattle ... may have the salutary effect in Zululand and either bring down a large force to attack us or else produce a revolution in the country.

[42] Sihayo and his senior son, Mehlokazulu, missed the action, having left the day before with the bulk of his fighting men to answer Cetshwayo's call to arms at Ulundi.

[46] News of the attack reached the Zulu king whilst he was considering which of the three British columns to engage with his main force.

[38] The prisoners released by Chelmsford on 13 January may have helped the inhabitants of Sotondose's Drift attack British survivors of the battle.

[49][7] Anglo-Zulu War historian Adrian Greaves, writing in 2012, regards the action at Sihayo's Kraal as a token victory against a small Zulu force consisting of old men and boys.

He considers there was no military value to the engagement as Sihayo's warriors had already left the kraal to assemble with the main army and could not threaten Chelmsford's supply lines.