[7] Although the United States and France had allowed their soldiers to profit from booty on a basis similar to Britain, they abolished the practice in 1899 and 1901 respectively.

By ancient custom, the common seamen, but not the officers, of navy vessels had the right of free pillage, the seizure of the enemy crew's personal possessions and any goods not stored in the hold.

[20] Although neither Charles II nor his brother James, Lord High Admiral since 1660, had been ungenerous to those Royal Navy captains and flag officers that captured enemy ships, giving them a fair allocation of the value of their prizes, the failure to set out a fixed scale of prize money for senior officers led to a scandal in 1665.

Concerned that Charles's difficult financial position might make him less generous that before, and considering the great value of the cargoes captured, Sandwich, urged on by one of his flag officers, Sir William Penn, agreed that he and Penn should take goods to the value of 4,000 pounds, and that each other flag officer and the three captains that held knighthoods should take goods worth 2,000 pounds, from the captured cargoes: nothing was provided for the untitled captains.

[24] English privateers were very prominent at sea during the Anglo-Dutch Wars, attacking the maritime trade and fisheries on which the United Provinces depended, capturing many Dutch merchant ships.

Privateers were entitled to retain any ships captured and four-fifths of the goods, surrendering one-fifth of those to the Crown, and it was left to them how they sold their prizes and distributed the proceeds.

The final one-third was to benefit those sick and wounded, as before, and for the first time was also used to pay dependents of crew members killed and to fund Greenwich Hospital.

[29] If the Admiralty Court found that a seizure was unlawful, the ships and cargo was restored to its owner, and the captor would be responsible for any loss or costs arising.

[31][32] Occasionally, if an enemy merchant ship were captured where it was difficult to take it to an admiralty court or prize agent, the captor might offer to ransom it for 10% to 15% of its estimated value.

As a result of the Siege of Havana, which led to the surrender of that city in August 1762, 10 Spanish ships-of-the-line, three frigates and a number of smaller vessels were captured, together with large quantities of military equipment, cash and merchandise.

3. c. 160), issued after Napoleon's return from Elba, largely repeated the allocation below the flag officers' share into eight grades and, although it lapsed in the same year, its provisions were re-enacted in 1854 at the start of the Crimean War.

c. 24) was a permanent act, rather than one enacted at the start of a particular conflict, stating that prize money was to be distributed according to a royal proclamation or Order in Council issued when appropriate.

5. c. 30) changed the system to one where the prize money was no longer paid to the crews of individual ships, but into a common fund from which a payment was made to all naval personnel.

The award of prize money in the two world wars were governed by this legislation, which was further modified in 1945 to allow for the distribution to be made to Royal Air Force (RAF) personnel who had been involved in the capture of enemy ships.

[40] For much of the 18th century and until 1815, the main complaints about prize money concerned delays in its payment and practices that deprived ordinary seamen of much of what was due to them.

Although the incidence of captains selling captured ships abroad and defrauding crews of prize money reduced greatly in the course of the century, payment was often by way of a promissory note, or ticket to be paid when the relevant naval department had funds.

Although officers could generally afford to wait for payment, which was often made only in London and sometimes in instalments that might stretch over several years, most seamen sold their promissory notes at a large discount.

In the War of 1812, the Vice-Admiralty courts at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and, to a lesser extent, Bermuda had to deal with many, often small, American ships captured both by privateers and naval vessels, leading to lengthy legal delays in adjudication.

In order to minimise disputes, some captains and crews of ships on the same mission made time-limited agreements to share prize money.

[64] However, as Scotland was involved in the Second (1665–67) and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars (1672–74) against the Dutch and their allies, the Scottish Admiralty commissioned a significant number of privateers in both conflicts by issuing Letters of marque.

[84] During the Dutch Revolt, William the Silent as sovereign Prince of Orange, was able to issue letters of marque to privateers and, before the end of the 16th century five partly autonomous admiralties had emerged, under the oversight of the states general.

[98] During the Revolutionary War period, the Continental Congress had no navy and relied heavily on privateers who had been authorised by one of the states to capture British ships.

Admiralty courts for the state that had authorised the privateer adjudicated on the ownership of captured vessels and their value, and were subject to oversight by a committee of Congress.

However, a declaration by Abraham Lincoln that Confederate privateers would be treated as pirates and the closure of the ports of European colonies in the Caribbean as venues for the disposal of prize vessels and cargoes encouraged their owners to turn to blockade running.

However, the United States did not sign the declaration, in part because it considered that, if privateering were to be abolished, the capture of merchant ships by naval vessels should also cease.

Despite this, the United States agreed to respect the declaration during the American Civil War, although Lincoln's cabinet did discuss the use of privateers against British merchant shipping in the event Britain recognised the Confederacy.

The most significant change was that the residue of prize money after making these awards was to be divided amongst the remaining officers and men in proportion to their rates of pay.

Until the early 1880s, American naval opinion considered that privateering remained a viable option, although subsequent increases in the size of the US Navy changed this view.

Although the Odenwald was not a warship, it was sailing under the United States flag and claiming to be registered there, and also carrying contraband, either of which rendered the ship liable to arrest although not condemnation as a prize.

However, between 1775 and 1815, revenues declined sharply, largely because the probability of seizing a prize ship fell dramatically, partly owing to the increasing numbers of naval vessels competing for captures.