[2] The Norwegian Prime Minister Gunnar Knudson thought that another coal shortage would cause mass unemployment, social unrest and possibly revolution.

It was suggested that rather than sell the fleet, the Norwegians should charter it and that armed British ships be substituted on the routes suffering the worst losses from German U-boats.

[4] Since the autumn of 1914 six minesweeping trawlers sailed from each port on the east coast just before dawn and swept the local section of the channel which was 800 yd (730 m)-wide and 200 nmi (370 km; 230 mi)-long, the sweep being repeated late in the day.

[5] The monthly quota of 250,000 long tons (250,000 t) of coal required daily convoys from Lerwick, most being neutral Scandinavian ships, usually escorted by two British destroyers from a pool of eight detached from the Grand Fleet, supported by several armed trawlers.

[9] In November, British coal deliveries were less than half of the monthly 250,000 long tons (250,000 t) quota, making the Admiralty reluctant to allow more delays on the Scandinavian convoy run.

The first German shells cut the main steam-pipe, scalding many of the engine-room crew to death; the captain, Edward Brooke, was wounded, the wireless transmitter destroyed and the ship was left dead in the water.

The torpedoes and guns could not be used simultaneously, because the range and deflection transmitters were not working but Mary Rose attacked the German cruisers at high speed, opening fire from 6,000 to 7,000 yd (3.0 to 3.5 nmi; 3.4 to 4.0 mi; 5.5 to 6.4 km).

It transpired that Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, had received more decoded signals, leading the code breakers to infer that Brummer was not on a mine laying sortie.

[14] The commander of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, was pleased with the results of the action off Lerwick but decided to mount another operation when it was clear that Scandinavian ships were still sailing the Bergen–Lerwick route.

The 2nd (destroyer) Flotilla was to be escorted by the light cruiser SMS Emden which would wait to the north-east of the Dogger Bank, the point where the half-flotillas separated, to act as a wireless relay station.

[17] After the action off Lerwick, a conference at the Admiralty was held on 22 October from which on 5 November Beatty and his staff made proposals to change the system of Scandinavian convoys.

[18] A meeting was held at Rosyth which recommended that convoys should sail from Methil Docks, on the north bank of the Firth of Forth, which was better equipped than Lerwick and closer to Swedish and Danish trade routes.

[19] At 2:00 p.m. on 10 December, a southbound convoy, mainly of colliers, departed from Lerwick for Immingham in the Humber estuary, escorted by the destroyers HMS Ouse and Garry.

A general southbound convoy also left Lerwick for ports on the east coast, escorted by the destroyers HMS Rother and Moy.

The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron (HMS Chatham, Yarmouth and Birkenhead, SNO Captain Louis Woollcombe) with four destroyers sailed at 5:15 p.m. to be 30 nmi (35 mi; 56 km) off Jæren in Norway by 8:30 a.m. on 12 December, for a sweep southwards along the west side of the Skaggerak to Bovbjerg Fyr (Bovbjerg lighthouse) in Denmark and return during the night.

Kolbe changed course for Utsira off the Norwegian coast, the better to fix his position and to hunt for a convoy known to have sailed from Drammen in south-east Norway.

[26] Neither destroyer captain had been told about the covering force; Pellew crossed the front of the convoy to reach the threatened northern side, followed by Partridge which signalled to Beatty, the commander-in-chief that several German ships were close by.

The German gunners were characteristically quick and accurate and before long, Partridge received a hit at the front of the engine room, cutting the main steam-pipe, filling the engine-room with super-heated steam, killing the occupants.

[29] After opening fire, Pellew was hit in the engine-room and lost speed; Cavendish ordered a turn to bring the torpedoes to bear but the electric cables to them had been severed and only one was launched.

[32] At noon, the wireless operators on Shannon received the signal from Partridge and Molteno ordered an increase of speed to 20 kn (23 mph; 37 km/h) and fifteen minutes later, Molteno received another signal, without the call sign of the sending ship due to German wireless jamming but "enemy destroyers at T rendezvous" (the second rendezvous) could be read.

[20] Despite misinterpreting the intercepted signals, the 4th Half-Flotilla was closing on the convoy escorted by Ouse and Garry which, by noon on 11 December, had sailed as far south as Aberdeen, reaching a point 45 nmi (52 mi; 83 km) east of Fife Ness by 4:00 p.m., an hour before Heinrich read the wireless messages.

The weather deteriorated after dark and in the fog and rain, the Danish Peter Willemoes and the Swedish Nike straggled from the convoy, the escorts taking this for the ship captains deliberately making for Blyth, their destination.

The German destroyers sank it with torpedoes and left the survivors behind, Kolbe forfeiting the opportunity to glean intelligence about the convoy before turning north, away from it.

[37] While the German destroyers were sinking Peter Willemoes, the Scandinavian convoy was passing Coquet Island, 30 nmi (35 mi; 56 km) to the south, still vulnerable to interception and destruction before daylight.

The Senior Naval Officer at the Tyne signalled the destroyers and received a reply that the sounds had been heard, apparently at a distance, leaving him content that the convoy was safe.

[42] In 1994, Paul Halpern wrote that the German successes against the Scandinavian convoys caused much unrest in Britain against the Admiralty and was instrumental in the sacking of Jellicoe from the post of First Sea Lord that December.

[43] In 2019, Steve Dunn wrote that the Germans had managed to limit wireless communication during the raid, which left Room 40 bereft of opportunities to forewarn the Admiralty.

[49] Under cover of the squalls and mist, Pellew crossed into Norwegian territorial waters at about 3:00 p.m. and anchored near Slotteroe Island to make repairs.

HMS Sabrina arrived to take on the crew if Pellew was too badly damaged to sail before the internment deadline (24 hours) in neutral waters.

Because the new route was longer than Lerwick to Bergen and riskier, a battle squadron of the Home Fleet reinforced the local escorts, a departure from the principle of concentration of force since the beginning of the war.