Only the battlecruisers Moltke and Von der Tann were serviceable after Jutland and the force was bolstered by the battleships Bayern, Markgraf and Grosser Kurfürst.

[3] The Harwich Force of twenty destroyers and five light cruisers (Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt) was ordered out, as were 25 British submarines which were stationed in likely areas to intercept German ships.

[5] The German force had received reassurances about Jellicoe's position, when a Zeppelin spotted the Grand Fleet heading north away from Scheer, at the time it had been avoiding the possible minefield.

Zeppelin L 13 sighted the Harwich force approximately 75 nmi (86 mi; 139 km) east-north-east of Cromer, mistakenly identifying the cruisers as battleships.

The British submarine HMS E23 (Lieutenant-Commander R. R. Turner) managed to hit the German battleship SMS Westfalen north of Terschelling at 5:05 a.m. on 19 August but the ship was able to reach port.

[7] On 13 September, a conference was held between Jellicoe and the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, on Iron Duke to discuss recent events.

It was provisionally decided that it was unsafe to conduct fleet operations south of latitude 55.5° North (approximately level with Horns reef and where the battle of Jutland had taken place).

[11] From 18 to 19 October, Scheer led a brief sortie into the North Sea of which British intelligence gave advance warning; the Grand Fleet declined to prepare an ambush, staying in port with steam raised, ready to sail.

The German sortie was abandoned after a few hours when SMS München was hit by a torpedo fired by E38 (Lieutenant-Commander J. de B. Jessop) and it was feared other submarines might be in the area.