Admiralty code breakers had uncovered the call signs of Bremse and Brummer and by direction finding knew that they had sailed from Wilhelmshaven to Lister Tief (Lister Deep) north of Sylt but an operation as far north as the Scandinavian convoy collier route was not anticipated by the British naval commanders because the Admiralty failed promptly to pass on the information.

Both of the British destroyer commanders were commended for their bravery, though some members of the Admiralty felt that by leaving the convoy to engage a superior enemy force, they had left the merchant ships open to attack.

Other British ships did not receive reports of the attack until late afternoon, were not in a position to intercept and the German cruisers returned safely to port.

Admiral David Beatty, the commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet, severely criticised the Admiralty for failing to pass on information derived from the code-breakers of Room 40.

The Norwegian prime minister, Gunnar Knudson, thought that another coal shortage would cause mass unemployment, social unrest and possibly revolution.

It was suggested that rather than sell the fleet, the Norwegians should charter it and that armed British ships be substituted on the routes suffering the worst losses from German U-boats.

[5] Beginning in autumn 1914, six minesweeping trawlers sailed from each port on the east coast just before dawn and swept a channel 800 yd (730 m) wide and 200 nmi (370 km; 230 mi) long, the sweep being repeated late in the day.

[6] The monthly quota of 250,000 long tons (250,000 t) required daily convoys from Lerwick, most being neutral Scandinavian ships, usually escorted by two British destroyers from a pool of eight detached from the Grand Fleet, supported by several armed trawlers.

[13] During late 1917, the commander of the High Seas Fleet, (Hochseeflotte) Admiral Reinhard Scheer, decided to augment the U-boat campaign with attacks on the Scandinavian convoys by surface ships.

Scheer anticipated that success would force the British to divert naval ships from counter-U-boat operations and create an opportunity to engage the Grand Fleet at an advantage.

Oliver had undertaken to pass on new data to ships at sea but failed to supply this, the inferences that could be drawn from them or to contact Beatty until eighteen hours later, by when the convoy had been attacked.

[22] Mary Rose departed from Bergen with the westbound convoy, comprising one Danish, five Norwegian, three Swedish, two British and a Belgian freighter, on the afternoon of 16 October.

The British devised a plan to lay mines close to the German coast and river mouths to take advantage of the High Seas Fleet operating temporarily in the Baltic.

[24] Ignorant that the Admiralty was failing to pass on information, Admiral David Beatty, the commander of the Grand Fleet, was constrained to scour the North Sea.

After notice from the Admiralty that Zeppelins would be reconnoitring on the same day, Beatty ordered HMS Furious, a battlecruiser which carried aircraft, to conduct a sweep eastwards from just north of Middlesbrough.

When the range was down to within 3,000 yd (1.5 nmi; 2.7 km) and before the crew could reach action stations, the German ships opened fire with their 5.9 in (150 mm) guns.

The German cruisers inflicted more damage on Strongbow while Elise was manoeuvring to rescue the crew and the ship sank at about 9:30 a.m.[28] Four of the merchantmen were sunk with gunfire; Fox heard the noise astern, assumed that a U-boat had attacked the convoy and turned towards it, with enough time to go to action stations, hampered by not being able to use the torpedoes and guns at the same time, because the range and deflection transmitters were not working.

[31] The wreck of Margrethe was sunk by Bremse and Brummer with broadsides from both beams as they left the area, making for home at 8:20 a.m. P. Fannon, the two British and the Belgian ships escaped; Elise returned when the coast was clear to rescue survivors, including 45 men from the crew of Strongbow.

The Admiralty thought that the German ships were still in port but postponed the Lerwick to Norway sailing due on 18 October, prompting Beatty to ask for clarification.

Oliver sent a report at 2:20 p.m. suggesting that the ships were chasing convoys (Bremse and Brummer were north of Bergen, running south for Horns Reef).

[34]Beesly wrote that had Beatty received the signal during the evening of 16 October, rather than after an eighteen-hour delay, he would have probably issued different orders, with more chance to protect the convoy and sink the cruisers.

[34] Beesly called the failure to communicate inexcusable; contemporary records show that all decodes were sent by Room 40 to the Operations Division with, at most, a fifty-minute delay since interception.

[35] In 1994, Paul Halpern wrote that the Admiralty was still overly secretive of its code-breaking activities and lack of liaison between departments led to failures of interpretation of information.

Room 40 discovered from its call sign that Brummer had sailed and assumed that it was on a mine laying sortie but was kept in ignorance of British ship movements, information on which was reserved for the Operations Division.

Halpern also wrote that it was remiss of the Operations Division to not consider that the German ships were out to attack a convoy and to take so long to communicate with Beatty, who, with some asperity, laid blame on the Admiralty in the aftermath.

[36] In 1969, Arthur Marder wrote that the fiasco was regarded as an outrage by the Allies, who protested that the attack on neutral ships was illegal and that the Germans gave the crews of the merchant vessels no time to evacuate, which caused so many civilian casualties.

Both of the British destroyer commanders received credit for bravery, though some members of the Admiralty felt that by leaving the convoy to engage a superior enemy force, they had left the merchant steamers open to attack.

Roeneviz told reporters later, The shells were now directed at us amidships and my men were swept down into the sea, together with the vessel's superstructure.Thirty-six merchant sailors were killed and 119 survivors landed in Norway.

Convoys should sail from Methil Docks, on the north bank of the Firth of Forth, which was better equipped than Lerwick and closer to Swedish and Danish trade routes.

From 11 to 12 December the Germans undertook a more ambitious operation simultaneously to intercept a Scandinavian convoy and shipping on the route along the British east coast to Lerwick and back.