The ruse failed; some of the British artillery-fire dropped short on the New Zealanders and the Germans engaged the attackers with small-arms fire from Polderhoek Spur and Gheluvelt ridge.

A strong west wind ruined the smoke screens and the British artillery failed to suppress the German machine-guns, which forced the attackers under cover.

The New Zealanders were 150 yd (140 m) short of the first objective but another attempt after dark was cancelled because of the full moon and sight of German reinforcements reaching Polderhoek Château.

Rain had caused the British temporarily to postpone attacks after the offensive began with the Battle of Pilckem Ridge on 31 July but in August the water had dried relatively quickly.

Haig abandoned the strategic objectives of the offensive in early October but ordered that once the weather had improved, Passchendaele Ridge was to be captured as a suitable winter position.

The tactical sophistication of the infantry had increased during the battle but the chronic difficulty of communication between front and rear during an attack could only partially be remedied by expedients that relied on observation, which was dependent on good visibility.

[3] German counter-attacks from the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge on 20 September to the end of the Flanders campaign, were "assaults on reinforced field positions", due to the British infantry making shorter advances after the torrential rains of August turned the ground into a swamp.

When the British attacked, the sentries were swiftly to retire across the outpost zone to the main line of resistance (Hauptwiederstandslinie) and the artillery was quickly to bombard the Vorfeldlinie.

The Germans fired area bombardments every day at intervals behind the British front but it was soon possible to predict the targets and avoid the worst spots.

[13] On 6 November, the last fresh brigade of the 5th Division attacked the spur at 6:00 a.m. after the divisional artillery had been reinforced to one 18-pounder for every 9 yd (8.2 m) of front, some firing shrapnel and some with HE shells fitted with Fuze 106.

South of the Reutelbeek, the British front line ran westwards and was enfiladed (vulnerable to fire on along it from a flank) at Cameron Covert and Reutel.

The ground had been devastated by artillery-fire and was covered in shell holes, trees had been toppled and the stream banks and beds had been smashed and were full of dead mules, making revolting swamps.

[17] At the beginning of December, the right flank of the New Zealand Division lay on a small rise at the lip of the plateau, at the high Jericho pillbox, beyond which the ground declined to the Scherriabeek.

The left flank was at Joppa, a German shelter in the cellar of a demolished house, behind which the ground fell gradually towards a crater field containing the Veldhoek pillboxes.

On the southern flank where the front line bent back westwards, the loss of the high ground in the IX Corps area from the Reutelbeek to Clapham Junction would endanger the supply routes to the New Zealand Division.

Haig ended the offensive on 20 November but wanted local operations to continue, to prevent the Germans from transferring troops to Cambrai, where the Third Army attacked on the same day.

It was intended to occupy the low, east-running ridge to deny German artillery-observers a view over the area between Cameron Covert, Reutel and Polygon Wood to the north and the Menin road to the south-west.

There was no room for troops to assemble and the Reutelbeek was a morass about 20–30 ft (6.1–9.1 m) wide; on the left bank the swamp was within 100 yd (91 m) of the New Zealand posts in Cameron Covert.

[24] The IX Corps heavy artillery could carry out the preparatory bombardment, avoiding the need to register new guns, which would alert the Germans.

[26] The prudence in assembling troops in the support line was justified, because some shells from the creeping barrage dropped short and caused many casualties as the New Zealanders moved into the open, especially in the left company of the 1st Otago Battalion.

[29] On the left flank, the 1st Otago Battalion was supported by machine-gun fire from the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, which several times dispersed German troops advancing down the Becelaere road.

Lack of experience among the recent replacements and the volume of machine-gun fire from undamaged pillboxes on the narrow front of attack could not be overcome.

About thirty German prisoners had been taken and the New Zealand survivors began to dig in on captured ground that gave a commanding view over the Scherriabeek valley.

[29] German infantry massing for a counter-attack during the afternoon at the higher end of the valley between Polderhoek and the Gheluvelt Spur were easily seen and a Stokes mortar was moved to Jericho.

Braithwaite wanted another attack after dark, possibly an enveloping movement from the Reutelbeek but the German reinforcements, the vigilance of the château garrison and the doubtful situation on the New Zealand left led to caution.

[32] An after-action report by the 2nd New Zealand Brigade noted that the attackers rehearsed during the four days from 27–30 November on ground specially marked to resemble the spur and the German defences but that this had been insufficient.

[33] On the morning of 4 December, German troops were seen massing on the east and south-east slopes of the spur but were dispersed by British artillery-fire and retired on Becelaere.

[30] The captured ground had great tactical value but Cameron Covert, Reutel and Polygon Wood was still exposed to view from the German lines.

[34] At dawn on 5 December, about 80 Germans made a surprise attack on the New Zealand left flank, got to within 30 yd (27 m) and knocked out a Lewis gun.