Administrative law in Singapore

[6] Judicial review is available as a means of challenging the legality of decisions of all governmental authorities, though it is regarded as a procedure of last resort that should be used only where the individual has no alternative remedy such as a right of appeal.

[7] On the other hand, when exercising judicial review, the High Court is almost always limited to examining whether public authorities have acted lawfully, and do not evaluate the substantive merits of decisions taken.

In that case, the statutory provision in question was section 75 of the Housing Act 1936,[25] which stated that powers of compulsory acquisition were not to be exercised by a local authority over land forming "part of any park, garden, or pleasure ground ...".

The Court of Appeal of England and Wales eventually held that the land in question was part of a park, and since the local authority had committed an error as to a precedent fact, its acquisition order was quashed.

[26] In Zamir v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (1980),[27] the House of Lords held that whether a case is in the "precedent fact" category depends on the "nature and process of decision" conferred on the public authority by the legislation.

If there is "room for appreciation, even for discretion" because, for example, the authority is required to consider numerous statutory rules and non-statutory guidelines, as well as evidence of doubtful accuracy or veracity, then the decision in question will be regarded as unsuitable for review by the court.

So long as Parliament makes its intention clear, the scope of review would be so limited, even where the liberty of the subject is concerned.On the facts, the Court was of the view that the discretion accorded to the President and the Minister for Home Affairs under section 8 of the Internal Security Act[33] to detain without trial a person believed to be a risk to national security, and accorded to the Minister under section 10 to suspend a detention order, did not fall within the "precedent fact" category.

Ltd. v. Minister for Manpower (1999),[46] the High Court cited the following passage from the judgment of the Privy Council on appeal from Malaysia in South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn.

[54] This principle was accepted by the High Court in Fong Thin Choo,[37] which approved the House of Lords decision Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (1976).

Thus, by ordering the applicant to change her business name, the Registrar had accorded to J.C. Penney more rights than it was entitled to under the law relating to trademark infringement and the tort of passing off.

[72] In R. (SB) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School (2006),[73] the House of Lords expressed the view that whether an individual possesses certain human rights is not a relevant consideration during a public authority's decision-making process.

[75] The financial resources available to a public authority when making discretionary choices in respect of the performance of its duties may or may not be a relevant consideration depending on how the courts interpret the overall legislative scheme.

The High Court held that the Minister had not exceeded the statutory power given to him as the main purpose of the rules he had imposed was consistent with the objective of the Act, that is, to regulate traffic on the roads.

[86] It is legitimate for public authorities to formulate policies that are "legally relevant to the exercise of their powers, consistent with the purpose of the enabling legislation, and not arbitrary, capricious or unjust".

[107] As regards the second question, in R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan (1999),[108] the Court of Appeal of England and Wales identified three categories of legitimate expectations.

[122] Nonetheless, the Court stated: "[W]e were not concerned with judicial review, nor were we deciding whether any claim of a legitimate expectation could estop the Prisons Department in future from applying the interpretation which we gave to life imprisonment.

[125] Commenting ex-curially, Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong cautioned against reading the case as an implicit acknowledgement that legitimate expectations can be substantively enforced.

Ltd. v. Jurong Town Corp. (2011),[128] the High Court "entertain[ed] some doubt" as to whether the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is part of Singapore law, but did not discuss the matter further as neither the respondent nor the Attorney-General had made submissions on the issue.

[139] The differing levels of intensity of review are set out in the table below:[140] In the Singapore context, there appears to be some implicit suggestion that the light touch test applies to certain cases.

The High Court concluded that the judicial process was unsuitable for reaching decisions made on such grounds, and that therefore it was "in no position to hold that it has been established that the Minister's exercise of discretion was irrational in the Wednesbury sense".

Thus, in Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney-General (2011),[152] the Court of Appeal held that a failure by the Cabinet to follow the procedure set out in Article 22P(2) of the Constitution when determining whether to advise the President to grant clemency to a person sentenced to death is subject to judicial review.

In deciding whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory, the courts will look at its purpose and relationship with the scheme, subject matter and object of the statute in question, and must assess the importance attached to it by Parliament.

[179] The rules of natural justice require that persons liable to be directly affected by the outcome of any decision must be given prior notification of the action proposed to be taken, of the time and place of any hearing that is to be conducted, and of the charge or case they will be called upon to meet.

In Dow Jones Publishing Co. (Asia) Inc. v. Attorney-General (1989),[194] the appellant was owner of a foreign business newspaper, the Asian Wall Street Journal, circulating in Singapore.

However, Chan Sek Keong J, delivering judgment on behalf of the Court of Appeal, dismissed this argument on the ground that the Minister's failure to give the appellants an opportunity to make representations neither amounted to unfair treatment nor had prejudiced it in any way.

[205] If a person is permitted to engage legal counsel but chooses not to, he or she cannot subsequently allege that the rules of natural justice have been breached because he or she is unable to mount an effective defence.

[219] Counsel for the applicant argued that the re-entry permit valid till 6 March 1987 gave the applicant a legitimate expectation that she would be allowed to stay in Singapore until the expiry of the permit, and that this legitimate expectation gave her at least two procedural rights: an opportunity to make representations, either orally or in writing, to the Minister before he considered her case; and a duty on the Minister to give reasons for the decision to deem her an undesirable immigrant.

[222] However, in dismissing the application, the Singapore High Court said that this statement was not supported by English authority and, in any event, Lord Denning had not explained when the opportunity to make representations ought to be given to an alien.

[227] Similarly, in Siah Mooi Guat, the Singapore High Court held that the Minister for Home Affairs was under no duty at common law nor under the Immigration Act to give reasons for his decision to cancel the applicant's re-entry permit and employment pass.

[233] In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003),[234] Justice Michael Kirby expressed concern about the "codification" of the grounds of review, suggesting that the ADJR Act might have "arrested" the development of common law doctrines.

The Supreme Court of Singapore . The High Court , which is housed in this building, conducts judicial review of administrative action in Singapore by exercising its supervisory jurisdiction .
Parliament House (left) at night, photographed in December 2009. Judicial review of administrative action is important in Singapore because the executive dominates Parliament 's legislative agenda.
Traffic signals along Stamford Road , Singapore. In Singapore, the courts are said to emphasise a largely green-light approach towards administrative law
Public housing built by the Housing and Development Board (HDB) in Woodlands . In a 1984 case, the High Court held that the HDB had acted unlawfully by compulsorily acquiring a flat when it had no power to do so.
Tameside Council Offices in Ashton-under-Lyne , Greater Manchester , UK. In a 1976 decision originally brought by the Education Secretary against Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council over the latter's refusal to implement a system of comprehensive education , the House of Lords held that a public authority's decision may be judicially reviewed if it is unsupported by evidence or has been based on incorrect facts.
An Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) gantry. The ERP scheme replaced the Singapore Area Licensing Scheme , the legality of which was the subject of a 1977 case.
Public housing in Tampines . A privatised Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) condominium called Tampines Court elsewhere in this estate was the subject of a 2009 case. The High Court held that the Strata Titles Board had acted irrationally by scheduling a hearing date after the contractual deadline by which the Board's approval of the sale and purchase of the condominium had to be obtained.
A depiction of Justice in Rodolfo Nolli's sculpture Allegory of Justice on the tympanum of the Old Supreme Court Building . The twin elements of natural justice are the rule against bias ( nemo iudex in causa sua ) and fair hearing ( audi alteram partem ).
Opposition politician Chiam See Tong at an election rally in May 2006
ICA Building, the headquarters of the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority , photographed in July 2006. In a 1986 case brought by a woman who had been declared a prohibited immigrant by the Controller of Immigration, the High Court accepted that the doctrine of procedural legitimate expectation applies in Singapore, but held that the applicant could not avail herself of it.