On February 15, 1992, the Douglas DC-8 operating the flight crashed during a second go-around attempt at Toledo Express Airport, killing all four people on board.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the accident was caused by pilot error due to the aircraft's control not being maintained.
After this however, captain Baker started complaining to first officer Hupp that he was flying too slow with the flaps not having been extended into the landing configuration.
[1]: 2 During the second approach the aircraft managed to capture the localizer, with captain Baker advising first officer Hupp about the wind conditions.
[1]: 3 At 03:25, first officer Hupp reported the go-around to the tower controller and were instructed to climb and maintain 3,000 feet (910 m) and then turn left onto a 300 degree heading.
Investigators discovered that when captain Baker took control, he became spatially disoriented and accidentally caused the plane to enter an unrecoverable bank and attitude.
The NTSB also focused on the aircraft's attitude indicators (ADI), human factors, the power changes by using the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), and the manner of first officer Hupp's approach.
If the cargo door had opened in mid-flight the CVR would suddenly record a loud sound of rushing air.
[1]: 36–38 The NTSB did believe that the first officer's ADI was functioning normally at the time of the accident because of his immediate response to captain Baker transferring control of the aircraft back to him, and properly executing the recovery attempt.
A larger, more rapid aileron input would have leveled the wings faster; and a more aggressive pullout could have been within the operating envelope of the aircraft.
Even if he had exceeded the approved g load for the DC-8, a large safety margin existed to preclude structural failure in extreme situations.
[1]: 59 The NTSB released the final report on November 19, 1992, with the "probable cause" stating: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to properly recognize or recover in a timely manner from the unusual aircraft attitude that resulted from the captain’s apparent spatial disorientation, resulting from physiological factors and/or a failed attitude director indicator.The NTSB was unable to determine with absolute certainty if any of these aforementioned factors (except for the cargo door incident which had been ruled out) had caused or contributed to the accident.