In the conflict's later stages, the Libyan Arab Republic Air Force intervened on the side of Uganda, but failed to make a tangible impact.

With the approval of Nyerere, these Ugandan exiles organised a small army of guerillas, and attempted, unsuccessfully, to invade Uganda and remove Amin in 1972.

Subsequent mediation resulted in the signing of the Mogadishu Agreement, which established a demilitarised zone at the border and required that both countries refrain from supporting opposition forces that targeted each others' governments.

As Uganda's government forged closer links with the Eastern Bloc, the UAAF began to acquire more aircraft as well as support in training from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Libya.

[10][11] Furthermore, the Israeli-initiated Operation Entebbe resulted in the destruction of a quarter of the UAAF in 1976;[12][13] Amin's regime subsequently received a substantial number of replacement MiG-21s from the Soviet Union and Libya.

[26] In addition, the Ugandan military possessed fifty 40mm anti-aircraft guns,[18] man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and nine radar stations for air defence.

[30] The Soviet Union also loaned air force personnel to Uganda, but the Ugandan Foreign Ministry announced that they were being placed on leave on 30 October 1978, as the conflict with Tanzania began, "to keep them out of the situation that does not concern them".

[32] As it was following an international policy of non-alignment,[33] Tanzania procured aircraft and trainers from a variety of countries, most notably China, Canada,[34] and the Soviet Union.

[d] The Libyan Tu-22s were second-hand aircraft imported from the Soviet Union, and suffered from serviceability issues; the bombers were both difficult to maintain and to fly.

In addition, Libyan Tu-22 crews were regarded by their Soviet instructors as being subpar, incapable of flying sophisticated bombing missions and more interested in their own safety than carrying out their tasks.

The ground attack was repulsed by artillery, but UAAF MiGs continued to cross into Tanzanian airspace, where they were again harassed by ineffectual anti-aircraft fire.

[36][50] Amin's government admitted the loss, but downplayed it by claiming to have shot down several Tanzanian fighters which had allegedly attempted to bomb Ugandan cities.

[36] After the repeated failures by their air force, the Ugandans finally employed a mining specialist who successfully destroyed the Kyaka Bridge.

[55] Journalist Faustin Mugabe argued that the UAAF's inability to attack Tanzanian territory from this point onwards gave the TPDF the "upper hand in the war".

[68] On 4 March UAAF MiGs were fielded against Ugandan rebels who were conducting a raid on the border town of Tororo, forcing them to retreat into Kenya.

Based on reports by Ugandan exiles, Honey estimated that only six UAAF combat aircraft were still serviceable, while 18 had been shot down and two had been used by defectors to flee the country.

In response, its ally Libya intervened in the war during the second half of February, sending an expeditionary force to bolster the Ugandan military.

[39] The Libyan Arab Republic Air Force (LARAF) ultimately flew in 4,500 troops as well as armour, artillery, and a substantial amount of supplies.

[76] Historians Tom Cooper and Adrien Fontanellaz have argued that it is unlikely that Libyan MiG or Dassault Mirage 5 fighters were sent to Uganda, as these short-range aircraft would have been forced to refuel several times to travel to eastern Africa.

[78] According to foreign diplomats based in Kampala, the PLO dispatched 15 pilots to aid Amin during the war, but played no role in the conflict due to a lack of available operational aircraft upon on their arrival.

[77] The Libyan bomber approached over Lake Victoria and aimed at destroying the fuel depot at Mwanza, but completely missed its target;[77][80] its five anti-personnel rockets instead hit the Saa Nane Island Game Sanctuary, slightly injuring one worker and killing six antelopes as well as several birds.

[80] The destruction of the development bank led many Ugandan soldiers to believe that the Tanzanians had acquired special munitions that could hit select targets on command.

[86] The TPDF also attempted to disrupt the Libyan airlift by tricking incoming planes into landing at Mwanza by sending messages to them on Entebbe Air Base's radio frequency.

Their commanders decided to secure it before attacking Kampala to end Libya's support of Uganda and eliminate the hostile forces gathered there.

[90] A dozen UAAF MiG fighters and one Uganda Airlines Boeing 707 were disabled in the attack and left on the runway,[91] while a Libyan C-130 (LARAF C-130H 116) was destroyed by an RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher as it attempted to take off.

[71] With Libyan forces having suffered heavily during the battle, Nyerere decided to allow them to flee Kampala and quietly exit the war without further humiliation.

[100] Nakasongola Air Base was found deserted by Tanzanian forces later that month; they seized Amin's personal Gulfstream executive jet.

[104] Two Ugandan pilots deserted with their aircraft around mid-April, one landing and surrendering with his family at Entebbe, while the other sought refuge at Kilimanjaro International Airport in Tanzania.

The post-war Ugandan government attempted to rebuild the air force over the immediate following years, but struggled due to lack of funds and only managed to acquire a few helicopters.

[110] American intelligence analyst Kenneth M. Pollack praised the Libyan airlift in Uganda as an "impressive operation", but criticised Libya's "incompetent" deployment of aircraft in combat and its failure to use aerial reconnaissance.