[2] Several al-Qaeda members quietly resided in Africa for years after receiving training in Afghanistan, forming part of a new network of sleeper cells established across the globe.

[4] In 1990, the National Islamic Front, the ruling party in Sudan led by Hassan al-Turabi, invited Osama bin Laden to relocate to the country.

Jamal al-Fadl, a Sudanese Al-Qaeda member, facilitated the purchase of large parcels of land and secured rental properties for the group.

During this period, the Saudi Binladin Group secured a contract to build an airport in Port Sudan, a project that bin Laden personally oversaw during his frequent visits to the country.

Bin Laden engaged al-Qaeda members in business operations and recreational activities, while maintaining low-level training programs, primarily refresher courses for veterans of the Afghanistan war.

Despite this shift in focus, bin Laden was at a crossroads and remained deeply troubled by the continued presence of the United States military in Saudi Arabia following the Gulf War.

[4] In 1996, Osama bin Laden was asked to leave Sudan after the United States put the regime under extreme pressure to expel him, citing possible connections to the 1994 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while his motorcade was in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Osama bin Laden finally left Sudan in a well-executed operation, arriving at Jalalabad, Afghanistan by air in late 1996 with over 200 of his supporters and their families.

[10] In the years following the formation of AQIM, government forces and military installations across the region—including in Algeria, Tunisia, Mali and other nations were repeatedly targeted.

AQIM's strategic leadership is based in the mountainous Kabylie region of Algeria, where ethnic Berbers have long struggled with the central government for greater autonomy.

[10] While al-Qaeda was based in Sudan during the early 1990s, the group’s military chief, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, established an East Africa cell.

[16] Despite believe that they had disrupted al-Qaeda's East African cell, operatives trained in Afghanistan stayed behind and continued plotting to strike American targets.

[17] Fax and satellite phone calls between Africa and Afghanistan along with electronic intercepts left little doubt in the CIA that Osama bin Laden had planned, funded and ordered the attacks.

Al-Qaeda's military chief Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, who was then based in Kenya, was killed traveling to Tanzania when the MV Bukoba sank in Lake Victoria only several days after Osama bin Laden had left Sudan for Afghanistan in 1996.

[15] After a raid of Osama bin Laden’s secretary, Wadih el-Hage's safe house in Kenya during 1997, U.S. authorities discovered he had been making frequent trips to Tanzania.

[19] As the LIFG was reconciling with the Gadhafi regime during the mid-2000s, many young Libyan jihadists went abroad to join Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to fight American forces.

[21] Later that year, Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed in a 28-minute recording posted on an Islamic website that "...members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group announce that they are joining the al-Qaeda group ..."[20] Abdelhakim Belhadj, a prominent rebel commander during the 2011 Libyan civil war, in an interview with the Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore admit that many of his recruits had al-Qaeda links.

[24] The White House Deputy National Security Adviser John Brennan said "I'm concerned about what is going on inside of Libya because there's been a fair amount of disorder and upheaval in the country", "The weapons stock piles - whether we're talking about missile systems or we're talking about automatic weapons - these are things that we and our European allies are working very closely with the TNC [Transitional National Council] and Libyan authorities to get some control over.

[10] The Sudanese government and Al-Qaeda feared the Americans intended to use US led United Nations operation in Somalia as a springboard to overthrow Khartoum.

[40] Alex de Waal, Lawrence Wright, Jonathan Randal and other journalists/academics have noted that despite assertions by some parties of an Al-Qaeda presence during the battle, no evidence exists to support these claims.

[43] Herman Cohen, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, noted the US decision making had been influenced by false Ethiopian intelligence.

[44] According to Ted Dagne, an Africa specialist for the US Congressional Research Service, the Islamic Courts had committed no act or provocation to initiate the Ethiopian invasion.

[46] During fighting in Somalia that took place in January 2007, the US claimed that it had successfully targeted Al-Qaeda operatives responsible for the 1998 embassy bombings, but later downgraded those who had been killed in the attacks as being 'associates with terrorists' instead.

[48] In March 2007, a White House study found that 'despite the ouster' of the Islamic Court Union, Somalia was a growing regional security threat and 'safe haven for terrorists'.

[53] Several months after the Ethiopian withdrawal, Foreign Affairs noted that Al-Qaeda's foothold in Somalia post-occupation was in significant part the result of the invasion.

Attacks by insurgents inflicted many casualties on local security forces and made the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) one of the most dangerous UN operations ever.

[57] After Osama bin Laden's death in 2011, documents found in his compound revealed discussions about a potential negotiated settlement between al-Qaeda, represented by AQIM, and the government of Mauritania.

One document, dated March 2010, proposed an agreement under which the Mauritanian government would release all imprisoned AQIM members and refrain from arresting other militants and students.

In addition, the plan called for an annual payment of 10–20 million euros to al-Qaeda, in exchange for which the group would cease military activities in Mauritania.

Ould al-Walid argued that Mauritania’s refusal to join the War on Terror in Mali conveyed to AQIM that the country would not target them outside its borders—though this stance did not constitute an explicit deal.