The McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32, operated by Alitalia, crashed into the woodlands of Weiach as it approached Zurich Airport, killing all 46 occupants on board.

[1] A Swiss investigation concluded that the accident was caused by a short circuit, which led to the failure of the aircraft's NAV receiver.

Swiss authorities also blamed inadequate crew resource management, exemplified when the captain vetoed the first officer's attempted go-around, along with the absence of lighting on Stadlerberg Mountain and a known problem with errors in reading the drum pointer altimeter of the aircraft.

[2][3] During the approach to runway 14 of Zürich International Airport, the captain's instrument landing system (ILS) display gave incorrect values due to a faulty receiver.

As a result, the aircraft produced an asymmetric lift force and began to roll to the right, finally slamming into the mountain in a nearly inverted position.

Additionally, Italian Interior Minister Vincenzo Scotti sent a team of investigators to the accident site along with the United States' NTSB and FAA.

Josef Meier, a spokesman for Swiss air traffic control authorities stated in a news conference that all possible causes, including terrorism, were being evaluated by the investigators.

[6] Italian news media reported that the mountain was covered with cloud and that there was heavy rain in the area, while Swiss investigators claimed that visibility was good during the accident with light showers occurring at the airport.

[1] On 16 November, an official from Swiss investigation team stated that the aircraft was flying at a lower altitude than it should have been: "The plane was 300 metres (980 ft) too low on its approach, and was slightly off course.

Investigators working with McDonnell Douglas concluded that, if the captain had not interrupted the go-around and had a situation awareness as the first officer had, the disaster would have been completely averted.

Investigators believe that the reason for the bad call was that the captain had no situation awareness at all and was completely dissatisfied with the first officer's performance during the flight.

[2] As Stadlerberg Mountain is relatively far from the runway, per International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards, obstruction lighting was not required.

However, due to the absence of a warning flag, the captain and the first officer believed that they were on the right track, and later used the NAV switching function to select the malfunctioning VOR/LOC receiver on both panels.

This type of altimeter has several disadvantages; for instance, in certain pointer positions, the needles partially obscure the readout resulting in the inability to accurately determine altitude.

He then countermanded the co-pilot's order for a go-around, as he thought that he could attain the correct glide path within a short time with a reduced rate of descent.