A German retreat from the salient that had formed around St. Pierre Divion and Beaumont Hamel either side of the Ancre, was considered by Generalquartiermeister Erich Ludendorff and the new army group commander Field Marshal Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria and rejected, due to the lack of better defensive positions further back, in favour of counter-attacks desired by General Fritz von Below the 1st Army commander.

At the end of September, the Anglo-French armies had crossed the Péronne–Bapaume road around Bouchavesnes, taken Morval, Lesbœufs and Gueudecourt in the centre and captured most of Thiepval Ridge on the northern flank.

On 29 September, Sir Douglas Haig instructed the Fourth Army to plan operations to advance towards Bapaume, reaching Le Transloy on the right and Loupart Wood north of the Albert–Bapaume road on the left.

Normal autumn weather in the Somme region would be an obstacle but an exceptional amount of rain and mist grounded aircraft and created vast mud fields, which caused many attacks to be postponed.

Haig issued a much less ambitious directive on 7 October but the poor weather, German tactical changes and reinforcements on the Somme front, led to the costly failure of many attacks by both sides.

Haig agreed that no attack should begin until the ground was dry enough for infantry to move freely, when there was a forecast of two days of fair weather and another postponement followed.

Movement behind the German front was made difficult by constant Anglo-French artillery-fire, which added to equipment shortages by delaying rail deliveries and interrupting road maintenance.

The emergency in Russia caused by the Brusilov Offensive, the entry of Rumania into the war and French counter-attacks at Verdun put further strain on the German army.

Assembly areas were prepared in Wood Post on the Authuille road and Blighty Valley and new communication trenches and deep dug-outs were built, before wet weather forced a postponement of the attack.

The remainder of Stuff and Schwaben redoubts were to be captured and the front line was to be advanced to Regina Trench/Stuff Trench (Staufen Riegel) on the reverse slope of the ridge, the attack being set for 1 October.

Gough pointed out that maintaining the momentum of an attack required succeeding waves and reserves not be kept waiting for opportunities to intervene in the battle, because communication delays left them with no time to act.

Corps headquarters also had the benefit of air observation and less need of direct communication with troops on the battlefield, since their main role was counter-battery artillery-fire, which was independent of the infantry battle.

After the British capture of Regina/Stuff Trench of 21 October, an evacuation of the salient from St Pierre Divion to Beaumont Hamel was proposed by Rupprecht but not implemented, because of objections by Below that the high ground still held gave valuable observation, which would be lost and that the remaining defences were strong and well-placed.

Staufen Riegel had been dug as a supply route to Staufen-Feste (Stuff Redoubt) and was on the reverse slope, which proved a considerable advantage against an attack from the south.

In the long periods of poor visibility, artillery observation aircraft were grounded, which made British bombardments even more inaccurate but the Marine Brigade still had a stream of casualties caused by shellfire.

[18] On 1 October the 2nd Canadian Division attacked Regina Trench with two brigades at 3:15 p.m. either side of the Courcelette–Miraumont road, despite many British shells falling short onto their jumping-off line.

[19] On the left, a brigade of the 3rd Canadian Division was stopped by German artillery, uncut wire and machine-gun fire short of Regina Trench, where it conducted a bombing fight, before withdrawing at 2:00 a.m.; a resumption of the attack was delayed by bad weather until 8 October.

Part of the 7th Brigade reached Regina Trench and began to bomb westwards and also worked its way up West Miraumont Road but was eventually forced back by German counter-attacks.

[22] In an operation by II Corps on 9 October, a battalion of the 39th Division attempted a surprise attack on the northern face of Schwaben Redoubt at 4:30 a.m. but the German defenders were ready for them.

East of the Courcelette–Pys road a defensive flank was formed, with outposts pushed forward from Regina Trench and the left-hand battalion linked with troops from the 18th Division.

Next day, a battalion of the 4th Canadian Division tried to advance along Regina Trench towards Farmer Road but they were stopped by flanking machine-gun fire and a German artillery bombardment.

On 29 October the 39th Division took more ground at Pope's Nose, before bad weather stopped operations in II Corps on the south bank, until the night of 10/11 November.

An escort pilot flying a Nieuport 17 turned back, after the bombers reached British lines but was then forced down in a dogfight with a faster German aircraft.

For the rest of the battle of the Somme, both sides flew in rain, mist, sleet and westerly gales, often at dangerously low heights, to direct artillery and attack troops with guns and bombs.

Better weather came on 8 November and many German aircraft made ground attacks on British troops, a tactic which the Luftstreitkräfte began to incorporate systematically into its defensive operations.

The raid on Vraucourt by twelve bombers and fourteen escorts became the biggest air fight of the war, when approximately thirty German aircraft attacked the formation as it crossed the front lines.

The importance of carrying enough hand grenades was stressed, since uncut wire forced the attackers into German communication trenches, where many more were used to fight forward, which used up the stock intended for repelling counter-attacks, compared to an advance on the surface.

Opinion divided over the Stokes mortar because of its rate of fire, each bomb weighed about 11 lb (5.0 kg), which meant that it was impractical to carry many forward in an attack.

[49] Tactics were considered and a new platoon organization was proposed by Major-General R. B. Stephens of the 5th Division, in which there would be four specialist sections, equipped with rifles, rifle-grenades, bombs and a Lewis gun.

Advancing by flanking manoeuvres was favoured, to exploit the German defensive change from trench lines to strongpoints, after they had been forced out of their front-line defences on the Somme.