The arduous journey of retreat to Armenia and then Syria further inflicted losses on his force, making the war a tactical Roman disaster and a strategic draw.

Primary sources for the 36 Atropatene campaign of Antony include sections, fragments or passing mentions in Strabo (Geographica), Livy (Periochae), Velleius Paterculus, Josephus (The Jewish War), Frontinus (Strategemata), Plutarch (Life of Antony), Arrian (fragments of Parthica), Florus/Justus (Epitome of Roman History), Cassius Dio (Roman History), Festus (Breviarium), Eutropius (Breviarium Historiae Romanae), Orosius, and the anonymous De viris illustribus.

[4] Benjamin Kelly (2008) noted that apart from agreeing on a few basic facts, the primary sources on Antony's 36 Atropatene campaign contradict each other on virtually everything.

[5] Discrepancies range from troop strength and losses; to which city was targeted by Antony's siege; to whether almost all Roman soldiers except Polemon I of Pontus in Statianus' supply forces were killed, or that many more were captured; to whether Antony's retreating infantry used the testudo formation tactic once or multiple times to ward off the Parthians; and whether the Armenian king was held responsible for the campaign's failure or not.

[5] Florus claims that at some point Antony walked into a Parthian trap and lost two legions, which no other source mentions, although one would expect Dio or Plutarch to do so.

[7] Julius Caesar, after ensuring victory in his civil war, planned a campaign into the Parthian Empire in 44 BC to avenge the earlier defeat of a Roman army led by Marcus Licinius Crassus at the Battle of Carrhae.

[citation needed] The Judean high priest and puppet Roman ruler, Hyrcanus II, was overthrown and sent as prisoner to Seleucia, and the pro-Parthian Hasmonean Antigonus was installed in his place.

[citation needed] With the aid of Mark Antony, a lover of Egyptian Ptolemaic Queen Cleopatra VII, the son-in-law of Hyrcanus, Herod, returned to Judea and recaptured Jerusalem in 37 BC.

The baggage train, which was protected by two legions under legatus Oppius Statianus and accompanied by King Artavasdes II of Armenia, took a different longer route.

[2] Although safe from Parthian attacks after arriving in Armenia, additional Roman soldiers died on the march to the Mediterranean due to inclement weather.

[16] Plutach even contradicts himself on whether the Armenian king's withdrawal of the cavalry, or Antony's decision to campaign during the winter season, was to blame for the expedition's failure.